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altered the trajectory of American corporate governance. When a
hostile takeover wave seemed imminent in Japan in the mid-2000s,
Japanese boards appeared to embrace this American invention with
equal enthusiasm. Japan’s experience should have been a ringing
endorsement for the utility of American corporate governance
solutions in foreign jurisdictions—but it was not to be. Japan’s
unique interpretation of the “poison pill” that was so eagerly
adopted by Japanese companies in the mid-to-late 2000s has turned
out to be nothing like their potent American namesakes—and, in
fact, the opposite of what would be expected by leading U.S.
academics who have built a cottage industry publishing on the U.S.
poison pill.
Based on hand collected empirical data, we provide the first indepth analysis of why Japan’s “poison pill” (defensive measures) is
heading towards extinction—a watershed reversal that is
unexplained in the Japanese literature and has almost entirely
escaped the English language literature. By drawing on our handcollected data, case studies, and Japanese jurisprudence, we
illuminate the unique and untold story of how one of the most
discussed mechanisms of corporate governance in the U.S. has
worked almost entirely differently when transplanted to Japanese
soil—the importance of which is heightened as Japan is by far the
largest economy in which the poison pill has been tested outside of
the United States. Additionally, our analysis sheds light on the
unexpected importance of Japan’s recently implemented corporate
governance code and stewardship code—two Western legal
transplants that have garnered considerable attention in the English
language literature, but which have yet to be evaluated in light of
their impact on defensive measures in Japan.
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INTRODUCTION
The advent of the “shareholder rights’ plan”, more popularly
known as the “poison pill”1, fundamentally altered the trajectory of
American corporate governance. Intended to defend vulnerable
boards from corporate raiders, the poison pill was embraced by U.S.
managers in the 1980s as a lifeline in a sea of hostile takeovers.2
When pundits predicted an imminent wave of hostile takeovers in
Japan in the mid-2000s,3 Japanese boards appeared to embrace the
American invention of the poison pill with equal enthusiasm.4
Japan’s experience should have been a ringing endorsement for
the utility of American corporate governance solutions in foreign
jurisdictions and served as evidence supporting the view that
corporate governance around the world is destined to converge on
the American model.5 That is, but for two “inconvenient truths” that
foreign observers and corporate law scholars have overlooked.
These inconvenient truths not only make what occurred in Japan
entirely different from what occurred in the United States, but also
offer novel insights into how defensive measures have evolved in an
unpredictable way in the world’s third largest economy.
The first inconvenient truth, which two of the authors previously
explored, is that Japan’s “poison pill” is fundamentally different
from the U.S.-style poison pill.6 The second inconvenient truth—
which this Article exposes—is that the “poison pills” that were the
darling of Japanese companies in the mid-2000s have, since their
brief moment in the sun, gone into sustained decline in the most
1
See Frank Allen & Steve Swartz, Lenox Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense,
WALL STREET J., June. 16, 1983, at 2 (providing the first known use of the term
“poison pill”).
2 See infra Part 1.
3 See Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile
Takeovers in Japan: Bidder Beware, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 4, 13-15 (2018) (mentioning
several predictions around a possible wave of hostile takeovers in Japan in the mid2000s and explaining how some idiosyncratic Japanese factors could account for the
unfulfilled predictions).
4 See infra Section 4.1.
5 Compare Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40, 468 (2001) (declaring that convergence
toward a standard, shareholder-centric model—that has always been dominant in
the United States—had occurred) with Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of
American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History for Corporate
Law, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 9-10 (2007) (rejecting the convergence debate as
irrelevant because corporate governance systems always evolve).
6 See generally Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3.
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striking reversal of its kind outside of the U.S. and appear to be
heading towards extinction.
This Article reveals empirical evidence showing that two trends
have fundamentally reshaped the so-called “poison pill” in Japan.
First, after an initial boom from 2005–2008, during which hundreds
of Japanese companies adopted “pills” each year, new adoptions of
the “pill” fell precipitously. In 2008, which was the last year of the
boom, listed companies in Japan adopted 207 “pills”. The next year,
in 2009, merely 21 “pills” were adopted. In 2010, a paltry 4 “pills”
were adopted, and every year since then the number of companies
adopting “pills” has remained in the single digits.7 The obvious
puzzle is: what happened in 2008 to cause listed companies in Japan
to virtually cease adopting new “pills”, and what has sustained this
“new normal” over the past decade?
Second, in 2013–2014, the rate at which companies in Japan that
had previously adopted a “pill” and then later decided to remove it
spiked. Interestingly, almost all these removals took place because
management decided not to seek shareholder approval to renew an
existing “pill” (which is normally required every three-years
according to the terms of Japanese “pills”).8 In 2013, merely 3.61%
of listed companies did not renew their “pills”, compared with
22.60% in 2018. Our hand collected data reveals that the nonrenewal rate increased significantly around 2013–2014 and has been
rising ever since.9 The obvious puzzle is: why did the rate of nonrenewals spike around 2013–2014, and why has it continued to rise
ever since?
The combined effect of the collapse of new “pill” adoptions after
2008, with the spike in non-renewals after 2013, is that the total
number of listed companies with “pills” in Japan has been rapidly
falling. Based on our hand collected data, in 2016–2017, for every
firm that adopted a new “pill”, sixteen failed to renew existing
ones.10 This has placed the “pill” in Japan on a trajectory towards
extinction—transforming Japan into the “land of the falling ‘poison
pill’”.
This Article seeks to solve these puzzles by providing what is, to
our knowledge, the first in-depth analysis in the comparative
corporate governance literature of Japan’s surprising reversal on the
7
8
9
10

See infra Table 2, Fig. 2.
See discussion infra Section 4.1; infra notes 179-181; Table 3, Fig. 2.
See infra Table 2, Fig. 2.
See infra Section 4.1.
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“poison pill” by drawing on Japanese sources that were before now
unexplored in the English-language literature. The reasons behind
the watershed reversal in the adoption of the so-called “poison pill”
by Japanese companies, to our knowledge, have also not been
explored in either English or Japanese. This gap in the comparative
corporate governance literature is glaring as it is the largest reversal
of its kind outside of the U.S. and involves a mechanism that has
produced a small cottage industry of academic musings in the
leading U.S. literature.11
Specifically, we offer three explanations for the decline of
Japan’s “poison pill” supported by empirical data, case studies,
Japanese jurisprudence, and an in-depth review of Japanese
academic literature and financial industry reports. First, the fact that
the prophesied tsunami of hostile bids in the mid-2000s failed to
produce even a single successful hostile takeover, combined with a
dearth in hostile acquirers following the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis, reduced the threat of hostile takeovers that was an impetus
for Japanese managers to adopt the “pill” in the pre-2008 boom
years.12
Second, the so-called “poison pill” in Japan is a far cry from the
potent poison that many thought it would be when the government
approved its use in 2005—which, at that time, appeared to have been
created “in the shadow of Delaware”.13 Over the past decade it has
become increasingly clear that the so-called “pill” in Japan lacks the
active ingredient of its American namesake: providing the board—
without shareholder approval—a veto right over a hostile bid.14
Empirical evidence demonstrates that almost all so-called Japanese
“pills” require some form of shareholder approval, which makes
11
For a sampling of frequently-cited articles focusing on or devoting
substantial attention to the poison pill, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1936-48 (1991); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Just Say Never—Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:
An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989); Michael Klausner, Fact
and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-1352 (2013);
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491 (2001); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J.
CORP. L. 381 (2002).
12
See infra Section 4.2.
13 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers
in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2196-96 n.82 (2005) (describing the process by
which Delaware takeover jurisprudence was adopted).
14
See infra Section 2.2.
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sense considering they have been designed in the shadow of
ambiguous Japanese (not Delaware) jurisprudence. This scant and
ambiguous jurisprudence has not established that boards—without
shareholder approval—can adopt, maintain or even trigger a “pill”
in Japan.15 We query whether a “pill” that requires shareholder
approval should even be called a “pill”—a point discussed in detail
below. Here, the crucial point is that, as it has become increasingly
clear that Japanese “pills” fail to provide the board with an
unambiguous veto—without shareholder approval—over a hostile
bid, the incentive for management to adopt them has significantly
diminished.
Third, more recent changes to Japan’s corporate governance
environment have provided the impetus for increased institutional
investor resistance to the introduction of new “pills” and, more
importantly, for approving the renewal of expiring ones. In 2015,
Japan adopted a “comply or explain” Corporate Governance Code
with an idiosyncratic provision: the requirement that companies
comply with having no “poison pill” or explain why they have
one16—a particularly challenging task in the only major developed
economy that has yet to experience a successful hostile takeover.
Then, in 2017, Japan amended its Stewardship Code to, among other
things, require institutional investors to disclose their votes on
individual agenda items.17 Again, in an economy with no successful
hostile takeovers, for an institutional investor to disclose their
support for renewal of existing “poison pills” would call for an
explanation. The timing appears to be significant: shortly before
Japan’s revised Stewardship Code went into effect, the ratio of
removals/adoptions of the so-called “poison pill” increased
markedly, making this the most devastating blow yet to the “pill” in
Japan and corresponding to institutional investors voluntarily
disclosing their votes to prepare for the inauguration of the
Stewardship Code. This timely fall in the “poison pill” is highly
interesting, as it suggests that Japan’s Stewardship Code
amendment may have prevented institutional investors from
continuing to act in support of management. This is a tangible
See infra Section 2.3.
See infra notes 201-202; Japan’s Corporate Governance Code [Final
Proposal] Seeking Sustainable Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value
over the Mid-to Long-Term, The Council of Experts Concerning the Corporate
Governance Code (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/
corporategovernance/20150306-1/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2VL-DYZN].
17 See infra note 206.
15
16
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impact on corporate governance not previously foreseen or
contemplated by the growing international stewardship literature.18
This Article proceeds as follows: Part 1 begins by providing the
comparative legal context by explaining the Anglo-American
approach to takeover regulation, including the U.S.-style poison pill
and United Kingdom (“U.K.”) regulations on defensive measures;
Part 2 describes the legal design of the so-called Japanese “poison
pill”, which is fundamentally different from its U.S. counterpart and
belies a direct comparison in the Anglo-American context; Part 3
illuminates the broader Japanese corporate governance
environment for hostile takeovers to provide a clear context for
evaluating the “pill” in Japan on its own terms; Part 4 sets out what
is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first analysis explaining what has
been driving Japanese firms to dismantle their so-called “pills”. The
Article concludes by highlighting possible future research questions
raised by the ostensible transplant of the American poison pill into
Japanese soil.
1.

ANGLO-AMERICAN MEDICINE FOR AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
DISEASE: A BRIEF HISTORY

Conceived in 1982 by the enterprising New York attorney
Martin Lipton, the U.S.-style “poison pill” is a legal mechanism that
a corporate board can adopt in response to an unsolicited takeover
bid. Its purpose, as originally conceptualized by Lipton, was to buy
the board more time to plan a course of action that would “maximize
shareholder value.”19
Modern poison pills are diverse in form, but most are based on
corporate “rights” that are triggered when an acquirer reaches a
certain ownership threshold (typically from 10 to 20%) in the target
See infra note 213.
Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 104344 (2002).
18
19

In September 1982, I published a memorandum describing the ‘Warrant
Dividend Plan.’ The ‘warrant’ of the Warrant Dividend Plan was a security
that could be issued by the board of directors of a target company (before
or after it was faced with an unsolicited bid) that would have the effect of
increasing the time available to the board to react to an unsolicited bid and
allowing the board to maintain control over the process of responding to
the bid. Beginning at the end of 1982, in various forms it was used
successfully by targets of hostile bids to gain time and maximize
shareholder value.
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company; once triggered, the target company’s shareholders, other
than the acquirer, may purchase additional shares on favorable
terms, with the effect of diluting the acquirer’s holdings.20 What
made the poison pill attractive was that it could be implemented by
the board on its own initiative, and without shareholder consent.21
This revolutionary legal device soon obtained the imprimatur of the
Delaware Supreme Court in a line of cases decided in the 1980s,22
and made it possible for the board to “just say no” to any hostile bid
by deciding to adopt a poison pill.23
Notwithstanding a decades-long normative debate about
whether a board should have the right to “just say no” to a takeover
bid,24 the creation and adoption of the poison pill fundamentally
shifted the balance of corporate governance power from

20
Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Control Transactions, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 205, 216
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed., Oxford University Press 2017); see also STEPHEN
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 418-23 (3rd ed., Foundation Press 2015) (providing
a concise introduction to the modern poison pill comprising “flip-in”, “flip-over’,
and “redemption” elements).
21
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 909 (2002) (“At
least in the first instance, poison pills are adopted unilaterally by the board of
directors. Indeed, the fact that the pill did not require shareholder approval was
one of its main attractions.”).
22
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2.d 858 (Del. 1985) (requiring directors to rely on
an informed view of the corporation’s intrinsic value when making takeoverrelated decisions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(accepting utility of takeover defenses and directors’ discretion to deploy them
subject to an enhanced business judgment rule); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (directors not required to maximize short-term
value of companies, save where the company was to be sold for cash); Moran v.
Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (permitting boards to adopt
the poison pill, and recognizing the board’s power to ‘just say no’ until they were
replaced by the shareholders; judicial review of the board’s use of the poison pill
subject to the Unocal enhanced business judgment rule); Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
23
See Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, supra note 11, at 1941, 194447; Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 604 (1994) (“Thus, in a curious way, the logic of Time
and Unocal validates the use of the poison pill for a ‘just say no’ defense . . . .“).
24
The debate over the proper role of the board in hostile takeovers can be
traced back at least as far as Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981) and Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981). For a typical exchange
between the two camps, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Lipton, supra note 19.
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shareholders
to
boards25—with
independent
directors
concomitantly becoming the linchpin in the exercise of this new
found board power.26 The magnitude of this shift is illuminated by
the defeatist tone struck by one of America’s leading proshareholder corporate governance commentators in the 1980s:
The takeover wars are over. Management won. Although
hostile tender offers remain technically possible, the legal
and financial barriers in their path are far higher today than
they were a few short years ago. As a result, it will be
difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in takeover battles,
even if shareholders support the insurgents’ efforts . . . . This
remarkable transformation in the market for corporate
control resulted from the emergence of the “poison pill” as
an effective antitakeover device . . .27
In 1995, 60% of S&P 1500 companies adopted the poison pill,28
and between 1996–2000 every hostile acquirer in the U.S.
encountered a target armed with one.29 Hostile acquisitions fell
25
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189 (1999) (“Poison pills
have altered fundamentally the allocation of power between managers and
shareholders.”); Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Frank and Steven’s
Excellent
Corporate-Raiding
Adventure,
ATLANTIC
(May
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/frank-and-stevensexcellent-corporate-raiding-adventure/521436/
[https://perma.cc/V937-BXYJ]
(“Eventually, companies developed defenses, most notably the “poison pill,” which
dilutes the stake (and voting rights) of anyone who acquires a substantial amount
of stock without first obtaining the board’s approval. By the 1990s, power had been
returned to management.”).
26
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526 (2007)
(“The price of the power to “just say no” to a hostile bidder was a board that
consisted of a majority of independent directors and a process that would call on
those directors to exercise (at least the appearance of) independent judgment.”)
27
Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993). Grundfest would also
say: “With the demise of the hostile takeover, shareholders can no longer expect
much help from the capital markets in disciplining or removing inefficient
managers . . . . As a result, corporate America is now governed by directors who are
largely impervious to capital market or electoral challenges.” Id. at 862, 864. In a
similar, critical vein, see Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder
Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 837 (1998).
28
John C Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1307 (2001).
29
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN.
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precipitously over the 1980s,30 and remained low until through the
1990s,31 a phenomenon attributed at least in part to the poison pill.32
The M&A market also shifted decisively in the U.S. toward
negotiated, “friendly” acquisitions33 as the line between “hostile”
and “friendly” takeovers blurred.34

L. REV. 887, 926-27 (2002) (including pills adopted before the takeover attempt (i.e.
the “pre-bid” variety), or “morning after” poison pills adopted as an immediate
response to hostile bids).
30
Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at 879 n.33 (2002) (“Hostile acquisitions fell
from almost $127 billion in 1988 to about $45.5 billion in 1989, to a little more than
$11 billion in 1990.”).
31
Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 753, 761-62 (2000) (reporting that hostile acquisitions made up a minuscule
proportion of total M&A activity, but with a rebound in 1999).
32
Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, supra note 11, at 1931-32; see also
Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes but
Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 358 (2000) (“Takeover bids are no longer a
major device for eliminating under-performing management because management
has devised effective defensive tactics that make purchase-type takeovers
impractical. The principal defensive weapon today is a “poison pill” . . . .”).
33
Hamilton, supra note 32, at 358 (“Thus, in the United States today, takeover
bids are usually negotiated acquisitions rather than truly external bids. A surprise
unsolicited bid may be used to get the target’s attention and to open discussions,
but negotiation then usually follows in order to defuse the poison pill and other
defenses.”).
34
Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at 880-81; Paul Davies, Control Shifts via Share
Acquisition Contracts with Shareholders (Takeovers), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 561-62 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe
eds., OUP 2018) (“ ‘Just say no’ may be an accurate description of the formal power
held by target directors under the plan, but ‘just say no’ did not become an accurate
description of how target directors behaved.” . . . The combined effect of [two
developments in U.S. corporate governance] was to change “just say no” into “just
say yes, if it is a good price.”).
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Before long, shareholder-friendly academics,35 proxy advisory
firms,36 and activist shareholders37 responded by pushing for
35

See, e.g., Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, supra note 11, at 512 (2001).

However realistic the threat of a tidal wave of junk bond financed, twotier, bust-up takeovers, assisted by unthoughtful shareholders, may have
appeared to the Delaware courts in 1985, we know now that it was a
chimera. Between bidder and target now stand large sophisticated
shareholders with carefully considered views of corporate governance.
Shareholder initiated bylaws provide an imperfect, but realistic, way to
turn back the clock.
See also Bebchuk, supra note 24, at 1035.
The proposed approach—precluding incumbents who lose one election
from maintaining pills—would take away from pills the special
antitakeover power that they have in the presence of a staggered board.
Given that about half of public companies now have staggered boards, a
development with profound effects on the market for corporate control,
this approach would not address an issue that is merely theoretical.
Rather, it would substantially reduce boards’ ability to block offers and
would restore the safety valve of an effective shareholder vote in firms
with staggered boards.
See also Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Anti-Activist Poison Pills (ECGI Working
Paper No 364/2017, August 2017) 45, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2928883
accessed Jan. 14, 2019 [https://perma.cc/R4FK-LMZP].
With the caveat that purely economic exposure should generally not count
towards the threshold, we would regard non-discriminatory pills with a
20% threshold as presumptively valid. Such pills seem overall reasonably
designed to prevent creeping control, and often serve to maintain a
balanced election process, without significantly impeding an activist. On
the other hand, even if economic exposure does not count, we would
regard anti-activist pills with a threshold of less than 10% and pills with a
“wolf-pack” trigger to be presumptively invalid. Such pills are not a
reasonable response to any cognizable threat and impose excessive
restrictions on the ability of an activist to conduct a credible contest and
communicate with other shareholders.
36
Francis J. Aquila, Adopting a Poison Pill in Response to Shareholder Activism,
PRACTICAL LAW
24-25
(Apr.
2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/
files/upload/Apr16_InTheBoardroom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SHN3-MXGM]
(“However, institutional investors and proxy advisory firms are generally wary of
corporate defenses such as poison pills because these defenses are generally
perceived to be merely intended to achieve board entrenchment. The perceived
abuses of the earliest poison pills also taint the image of the poison pill. As a result
of the substantial pressure from institutional investors and proxy advisory firms,
most U.S. companies have eliminated or watered down their poison pills. As of
December 2015, only 19 of the companies in the S&P 500 maintained any poison pill
at all.”); ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services), United States Proxy Voting
Guidelines:
Benchmark
Policy
Recommendations
26
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-VotingGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4BN-D7QD] (recommending a case-by-case
approach to management proposals on ratification of poison pills, and specifying

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/3

2020]

Land of the Falling “Poison Pill”

699

limitations on or removal of poison pills and other impediments to
takeovers such as staggered boards.38 These efforts resulted in the
number of companies with a traditional anti-takeover poison pill
declining by over half over the 2000s;39 by 2017, only 65 companies
that rights plans should have attributes including a “term of no more than three
years” and no “dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand, or similar feature that limits the
ability of a future board to redeem the pill”). An earlier draft of ISS’ policy for 2018
would have gone further by recommending voting against or withholding the vote
from all board nominees if the adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12
months: ISS, 2018 Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates Benchmark Policy Changes
for U.S., Canada, and Brazil, at 6 (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/
file/policy/active/updates/Americas-Policy-Updates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZLN-FN99].
37
Jessica Hall, Hostile Takeovers Hit Record as Market Swoons, REUTERS (Sept. 29,
2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mergers-hostiles/hostile-takeovershit-record-as-market-swoons-idUSTRE48S2P120080929 [https://perma.cc/E2LWMSJM] (“Hostile takeovers have more than doubled to a record level in the United
States so far this year, boosted by falling stock prices and weakened corporate
defenses . . . . In addition to the weakness in the U.S. stock market, with the Dow
Jones industrials down over 16% this year, hostile bidders gained an advantage in
recent years after many companies lowered their takeover defenses in the name of
good corporate governance . . . .’The activist movement and the response by many
companies to create more shareholder-friendly features—such as the
declassifications of boards, reductions in the numbers of poison pills—makes
hostile bids more likely to be successful,’ Selig said.”) (describing instances of
backlash from institutional investors).
38
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2002) (arguing that a
staggered board “offers a more powerful antitakeover defense than has previously
been recognized”). A concerted effort led by Professor Lucian Bebchuk (Harvard
Law School) has led to a substantial decrease in staggered boards among the largest
U.S. listed companies. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards/ [https://perma.cc/SFF5-LD64]
(noting that the Shareholder Rights Project led by Bebchuk has succeeded in
prompting one-third of S&P 500 companies with a staggered board to declassify,
and that by 2012 only 126 S&P 500 companies had staggered boards compared to
302 in 2002); ‘Declassifications’ (Shareholder Rights Project 2017),
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9SUM-RGGY] (reporting 102 declassifications attributable to
the Shareholder Rights Project from the 2012 to 2015 proxy seasons).
39
Matteo Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Apr. 3, 2011),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/04/03/poison-pills-in-2011
[https://perma.cc/GT48-MSNT] (observing that the number of corporations with
poison pills fell from more than 2,200 in 2001 to fewer than 900 in 2011). In recent
years, pills that could be triggered at the much lower ownership threshold of 5%
ostensibly to protect net operating losses (NOLs)—“NOL poison pills”—have
gained popularity. See Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
137, 191 (2016) (arguing that “the most effective and probable use of the NOL
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in the S&P 1500, or about 4%, maintained a poison pill, down from
54% in 2005.40
Although, at first blush, these dramatic statistics suggest the
death of the poison pill and the power of U.S. boards to “just say
no”, a more in-depth analysis suggests that the poison pill is still
surprisingly important and the shift in corporate governance power
back to U.S. shareholders is far from incomplete—or, arguably, has
hardly occurred at all. Boards still exercise their power to “just say
no” by adopting a poison pill not ex ante, but in response to concrete
takeover threats from time to time.41 In addition, all listed
companies in the United States, even those without an active pill in
place, received the effect of the “shadow pill”—as boards can easily
adopt a poison pill at a moment’s notice if the threat of a takeover
arises. Thus, in effect, every listed company in the United States
always has a (shadow) poison pill in place.42 Suffice it to say that the
poison pill is to thwart activist shareholders, with the existence of the deferred tax
asset providing pre-textual cover for the board”). The only poison pill ever
triggered is of the NOL pill variety; see Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5
A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
40
Kosmas Papadopoulos et al., U.S. Board Study: Board Accountability Practices
Review, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES 13 (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/board-accountabilitypractices-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWS2-FJ56].
41 Netflix Adopts Poison Pill, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 5, 2012),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/netflix-adopts-poisonpill/[https://perma.cc/UX2T-QTRZ] (“With Carl C. Icahn knocking on its front
door, Netflix has put up the traditional first line of defense against a corporate
takeover.”). Steven Davidoff Solomon, Hostile Takeovers Abound, but Success Is No
Guarantee,
N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(May
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/business/dealbook/hostile-takeoversabound-but-success-is-no-guarantee.html [https://perma.cc/393X-H5CR] (“Bayer
has made a $62 billion bid for Monsanto. It, too, has missed the deadline for
nominations for Monsanto’s board. And Monsanto has yet to adopt a poison pill,
although this can be done in a matter of hours. Because Bayer would have to obtain
antitrust approval before buying a substantial number of Monsanto shares,
Monsanto does not have to rush. . . . The Andersons has not yet adopted a poison
pill, a fact it has trumpeted. But it really does not need to take this defensive
maneuver.”).
42
John C Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 286-91 (2000) (based on a study of 92 bids
from 1996 to 2000). See also Francis J. Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Poison Pills Find
New Life as “Raider-Like” Activism is on the Rise, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2014/09/ke
eping-current-sawyer-201409.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4L6-3VL7]
(“Instead of maintaining 10-year poison pills as was typical in the 1980s and 1990s,
the standard practice now is to keep a poison pill ‘on the shelf’ and take it out on
an as-needed basis. If a company has fully briefed its board on the poison pill’s
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poison pill has made its mark on corporate governance in the United
States, not only when it burst onto the scene in the 1980s, but even
today as a central device for board power lurking in the shadows of
the U.S. corporate governance environment.
In the U.K., the legal prohibition on boards adopting defensive
measures without shareholder approval has prevented the pill from
having any impact in the world’s second largest market for
corporate control.43 In this context, it appeared—at least when
viewed through an American lens—to be an epochal comparative
corporate governance moment when the Japanese government
released its Takeover Guidelines in 2005, which ostensibly made the
poison pill legally available in Japan.44 The idea that one of the most
important legal mechanisms in modern American corporate
governance had been transplanted into the world’s third largest
economy,45 and the third largest stock market,46 captured the
attention of leading corporate governance academics and pundits in
the U.S..47 In the two years following the government officially
effects and prepared all the paperwork in advance, adopting a ‘shelf’ poison pill
can be a fait accompli in very little time.”).
43
For a leading account comparing the divergence in takeover regulation
between the United States and the United Kingdom, see John Armour & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO L.J. 1727 (2007).
44
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry & Ministry of Justice, Guidelines
Regarding Takeover Defense for the Purposes of Protection and Enhancement of Corporate
Value and Shareholders’ Common Interests (May 27, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/
policy/economy/keiei_innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_hontai.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QMX-BS8Y] [hereinafter Takeover Guidelines].
45
As of October 2018, in nominal terms, after the United States and the
People’s Republic of China. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October
2018)—GDP,
current
prices,
IMF
DATAMAPPER
(2018),
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC
/WEOWORLD/JPN [https://perma.cc/6MSH-8YW4] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
46
As of May 2019, and after the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. See
M. Szmigiera, Largest Stock Exchange Operators, Listed by Market Cap of Listed
Companies 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270126/largeststock-exchange-operators-by-marketcapitalization-of-listed-companies
[https://perma.cc/5DXH-SREE] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
47
Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (arguing that “the poison pill has the potential to
be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it has been in the United States, both
because of the absence of ameliorating institutions in Japan, and because . . . the
forces for change . . . outside the market for corporate control are significantly less
strong than in the U.S.”), 44 (noting that Japan serves as a useful “second data
point” on how poison pills affect the mark for corporate control); Milhaupt, supra
note 13, at 2216 (observing that Japan’s endorsement of the poison pill and
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sanctioning the Japanese “poison pill,” hundreds of listed
companies in Japan adopted it.48 The obvious question became:
would the “poison pill” have the same watershed impact on
Japanese corporate governance as it had in the United States in the
1980s? To answer this, we first need to be absolutely clear on one
thing: what exactly is Japan’s so-called “poison pill” as a matter of
law?
2. MEDICINE FOR PERCEIVED JAPANESE CORPORATE ILLS: THE
STRUCTURE AND LEGAL NATURE OF JAPAN’S SO-CALLED “PILL”
One of comparative corporate law’s greatest and most
intractable challenges is terminological. Proper use of legal
terminology ensures analytical rigor and highlights seemingly
minor, but otherwise decisive, differences between legal
mechanisms in how they operate in their respective contexts. A
preliminary note on terminology thus is in order. In this Article, we
consistently use the term “defensive measures” (as a direct
translation of bōeisaku) when referring to Japanese anti-takeover
defenses in general. As we discuss below, it is misleading to speak
of Japanese defensive measures as “poison pills”; we therefore
firmly part ways with a number of commentators on this point.49
Hence, “poison pill” without qualification is used exclusively to
describe the U.S.-model anti-takeover defense, whereas in the
Japanese context, any references to “poison pill” or “pill” will be
qualified with “so-called” or inverted commas.
Delaware takeover law as “a remarkable example of the transplantation of foreign
institutions, and potentially as a watershed moment in the evolution of corporate
law and governance in the world’s [then-]second largest economy”).
48
Fujishima Yūzō, Baishū Bōeisaku wo meguru Kinji no Dōkō (買収防衛策を巡る
近時の動向) [Recent Trends in Defensive Measures] DAIWA INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH:
CONSULTING REPORT (Feb. 20, 2009) 2 tbl 1, https://www.dir.co.jp/report/
research/capital-mkt/esg/09022001cg.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2VB-LBQZ].
49 E.g., Gilson, supra note 47, at 24-25 (referring to Japanese anti-takeover
defenses as “the poison pill”); Zenichi Shishido, Introduction: The Incentive Bargain
of the Firm and Enterprise Law: A Nexus of Contracts, Markets, and Laws, in ENTERPRISE
LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE US AND JAPAN 33 (Zenichi Shishido
ed., 2014) (“[S]everal mechanisms have been invented to reduce shareholder ability
to disrupt management . . . [including] Japanese-style ‘poison pills’ in Japan.”);
Toshiaki Yamanaka, Corporate Boards in Europe and Japan: Convergence
and Divergence in Transition, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 503, 516 (2018) (“[M]ore than
three hundred public firms have introduced the ‘Japanese version’ of the poison
pill since 2005.”).
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In the discussion that follows, we draw on the two-category
classification adopted in Japanese legal discourse: ex-post measures
and ex-ante measures.50 After introducing each category in turn (in
2.1 and 2.2, respectively), we contextualize Japan’s defensive
measures and associated legal norms by critically comparing them
with the U.S. and the U.K. (2.3). The comparative exercise exposes
fundamental differences between Japan and the U.S. and U.K. and
the importance of properly understanding Japan’s defensive
measures on their own terms.
2.1. Ex-Post Measures
Ex-post measures are adopted only after a corporation has been
specifically targeted by a corporate raider. The two classic defensive
measures available to the corporation are: (1) share or share-option51
placement,52 which is the issuance of shares or share options to a
specific party who is friendly to incumbent management; or (2)
option allotment, by which share options are issued to all existing
shareholders in a target corporation but with the options exercisable
by all shareholders except the raider.53
The latter—option
allotment—may be considered to be a rough equivalent to a pill
implemented after a hostile takeover attempt has commenced. In
Japan, neither variant has escaped judicial scrutiny entirely intact.
Share or share-option placements, which can be used by
management to alter the shareholding structure of a company, may
be challenged in court by aggrieved shareholders. Under Japan’s
corporate law legislation, a shareholder who is likely to suffer
prejudice from a share or share-option placement may apply for an
injunction restraining the placement on two grounds:
(1)

50
See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 22-38 (describing Japan’s
overall regulatory framework on hostile takeovers and distinguishing it from the
Anglo-American model).
51
The unofficial Japanese Government translation of shin-kabu yoyaku-ken is
“share option,” but they are also commonly translated as “warrants” in English
language-scholarly and business literature.
52
Also often called “share issuances” in the literature, the word “placement”
is used here to emphasize the action of “placing” the shares with a specific party or
parties as opposed to a general issue (“allotment”) to all shareholders.
53
In the early years, the raider’s options might, in some circumstances, be
redeemable for cash, or exercisable subject to conditions. See infra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
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unlawfulness or (2) an “extremely unfair” method of placement.54
Most challenges proceed under the “extremely unfair” limb—out of
which the Japanese courts have developed the “primary purpose
rule.” Briefly stated, if the primary purpose of the placement (i.e.,
the purpose that takes precedence over other legitimate purposes
such as raising capital) is to maintain control of the company, the
court may grant an injunction restraining the placement.55
It is important to note that Japan’s primary purpose rule was
developed not as part of directors’ duties but rather as an
interpretative gloss on a specific corporate law provision governing
shareholders’ rights.56 The rule’s focus on capital-raising, which is
inseparable from the nature of the statutory provision from which
the rule developed, is also a limiting factor. As Milhaupt and Pistor
astutely observed, “the [primary purpose] rule is not well suited to
judging the reasonableness of other types of defensive measures,
including the U.S.-style poison pill, that have no corporate finance
function.”57 It is thus not entirely clear how the primary purpose
rule in its original form applies in the context of defensive measures

54

For shares, Companies Act, art. 210 provides:

In the following cases, if shareholders are likely to suffer disadvantage,
shareholders may demand that the Stock [Corporation] cease a share issue
[of new shares] or disposition of Treasury Shares . . .
(i) in cases where such share issue or disposition of Treasury Shares
violates laws and regulations or the articles of incorporation; or
(ii) in cases where such share issue or disposition of Treasury Shares is
effected by using a method which is extremely unfair.
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Act. No. 86 of 2005, art. 210 (Japan). The text is based
on the Japanese Government’s unofficial (but widely used) translation at
[https://perma.cc/AX7E-KYCP]. The equivalent provision for share options is
Companies Act, art. 247.
55 See generally EGASHIRA KENJIRŌ, KABUSHIKI KAISHA-HŌ (株式会社法) [THE
LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS (translated title by source author)] 773-75 (7th ed.
Yūhikaku 2017); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 28-33 (describing the
history of Japan’s primary purpose rule, distinguishing it from U.K. law, and
illustrating its function in the case of Livedoor’s attempted hostile takeover bid for
Nippon Broadcasting System).
56
See Yamanaka Toshiaki, Seitō mokuteki rūru ni yoru torishimariyaku ni taisuru
kiritsu: eikoku 2006 kaisha-hō wo fumaete [Monitoring Directors with the Proper Purpose
Test: Lessons from the UK Companies Act 2006] 36-37 (Kinyū shōjihō [Fin. & Comm.
Law] Working Paper December 2014) [https://perma.cc/K2Y8-SBJ5] (describing
how the primary purpose rule operates in practice).
57
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD 93 (2008).
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other than share placements; we discuss this below in the context of
the watershed Livedoor case.
Second, it is widely recognized that Japanese courts have
traditionally been reluctant to find in a given case that an improper
purpose took precedence over other seemingly legitimate reasons
that would require the company to raise capital.58 In most cases, all
the target board had to do to survive a shareholder challenge was to
refer to some need to raise capital—a burden that was easily
discharged in practice.59 Once the court made a finding that the
company was in need of capital, the court would also, in principle,
respect the discretion of the directors as to the specific means for
raising finance.60 Hence, the prevailing jurisprudence on Japan’s
primary purpose rule suggested a strong judicial inclination
towards upholding the target board’s decision to issue shares to a
friendly stable-shareholder61 in the context of an ongoing takeover
bid.62
In contrast to the relatively well-established jurisprudence on
share placements, the question of whether post-bid share option
placements would pass scrutiny under the primary purpose rule
was answered more recently in the landmark case of Livedoor
(2005).63 The facts may be simply stated. Livedoor, an internet
company, shocked the nation by launching a hostile takeover bid for
Nippon Broadcasting System (“NBS”), a leading broadcaster in
Japan. NBS management quickly responded by announcing a plan
to issue share options to a friendly stable-shareholder as a defensive
measure, which, if exercised, would have dramatically diluted
EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773.
See Tomotaka Fujita, Case No. 29: Corporate Law—Takeovers—Issuance of Share
Options as Defence Measure—Principal Purpose Rule, in BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN: CASES
AND COMMENTS 317-18 (Moritz Bälz et al. eds., 2012) (discussing how in shareholder
suits, target companies will “most likely lose the battle if the purpose is recognized
as ‘control’ ” but will “easily prevail if the court rules the purpose is ‘finance’ or
another legitimate purpose”); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 29 (citing
the wide recognition that Japanese courts tend to uphold target boards’ decisions
as long as those boards refer to “some need to raise capital”).
60
EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773.
61
On this concept, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
62
Compare cases cited at EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773-74 (discussing cases
in which injunctions were not granted), with those at id., at 774 (discussing cases
finding an improper purpose to dilute a particular shareholder, majority of which
were decided more recently).
63
See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 30-33 (describing the events of
the Livedoor case, the court’s reasoning, and the thoughts of various commentators
as the events occurred).
58
59
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Livedoor’s stake in NBS. Livedoor applied to the Tokyo District
Court for an injunction restraining NBS from completing the
placement of the share options. The fact that the options, if
exercised, would have more than doubled NBS’ share capital made
it practically impossible for NBS to argue that the “primary
purpose” of the issuance was to raise capital and not to entrench
management.64
Unsurprisingly, the Tokyo District Court granted the injunction
in a decision upheld on appeal to the Tokyo High Court.65 The
Tokyo High Court, however, crafted an exception to the primary
purpose rule, laying down four limited circumstances in which a
target corporation’s board is permitted to conduct a share or shareoption placement even where the “primary purpose” was
maintaining control in order to protect shareholders’ interests
(rather than to raise corporate capital). These four circumstances
recognized by the Court (albeit in obiter) as clearly deleterious to the
interests of the target corporation’s shareholders are:
(1) greenmail (i.e. acquiring the target’s shares with the
intention of forcing the target to buy them back at a higher
price);
(2) temporarily taking control of and running the target to
advance the acquirer’s interests at the target’s expense, such
as by acquiring the target’s core assets at low prices;
(3) pledging as collateral for debts of the acquirer or its
associated corporations the target’s assets, or repaying such
debts using the target’s funds; or
(4) temporarily taking control of the management of the
target to sell off valuable assets not currently related to the
target’s business, and distributing the proceeds as

64
See Fujita, supra note 59, at 318 n.9 (noting that NBS did not even attempt to
make this argument but instead issued a press release announcing that its actions
were intended to preserve the nature of the firm as a mass media company).
65
Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 23, 2005, 1173 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 125. See Fujita, supra note 59, at 313-15 (summarizing the Livedoor
case). See also KIGYŌ-BAISHŪ WO MEGURU SHOSŌ TO NIPPON-HŌSŌ-JIKEN KANTEI-IKEN (
企業買収をめぐる諸相とニッポン放送事件鑑定意見) [VARIOUS ASPECTS ON
TAKEOVERS AND EXPERTS’ OPINION IN THE NIPPON BROADCASTING SYSTEM CASE] (別冊
商事法務編集部 [Editorial Board of Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu] ed., 別冊商事法務289号
[Vol. 289, Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu], Shōji Hōmu 2005).
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dividends, or disposing of the target’s shares at a price as
inflated by the dividends.66
The principles laid down by the Tokyo High Court in Livedoor
were soon incorporated directly into the Takeover Guidelines issued
jointly by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the
Ministry of Justice in 2005.67 Although expressly framed as nonbinding in a strict legal sense,68 the Guidelines’ stated aim was
nonetheless to serve as a code of conduct for the business
community.69 Hence, notwithstanding its amorphous legal nature,
this document is highly instructive, as it states in no uncertain terms
that “it is legitimate and reasonable for a joint-stock corporation to
adopt defensive measures designed to protect and enhance
shareholder interests by preventing certain shareholders from
acquiring a controlling stake in the corporation.”70 Despite their
initial setback in the courts, defensive measures nonetheless
received the imprimatur of Japan’s politico-legal establishment.
The second landmark case, Bull-Dog Sauce (2007),71 remains the
only case in which the Supreme Court of Japan, the nation’s apex
court, addresses the question of the legality of defensive measures

66
See CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, CORPORATE VALUE REPORT 33 n.57
(May 27, 2005), [https://perma.cc/N85Z-EDQQ] (describing the four exceptions as
takeover defense measures); Fujita, supra note 59, at 315, 319 (describing the four
exceptions as means of protecting shareholders from hostile buyers and discussing
potential problems these exceptions might cause); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra
note 3, at 33 (describing the four exceptions and asserting the court’s intent to use
them as a filter “that would allow wealth-enhancing takeovers to proceed without
interference from target boards, but still permit target boards to block wealthreducing hostile takeovers”).
67 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 4 n.1 (“The following can be cited as
typical defensive measures to protect and enhance shareholder interests[:] (i)
Takeover defense measures to prevent takeovers that would cause an apparent
damage to shareholder interests [in any of the four Livedoor circumstances].”).
68 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“The Guidelines are not legally binding.”).
69 See id. at 3 (“The mission of the Guidelines is to change the business
community from one without rules concerning takeovers to one governed by fair
rules applicable to all. To prepare for the upcoming era of M&A activity, we expect
the Guidelines to become the code of conduct for the business community in Japan
by being respected and, as the need arises, revised.”).
70 Id. at 4.
71
Supreme Ct. [Saikō Saibansho] August 7, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2215. See Hiroshi Oda, Case No. 30: Corporate Law—
Takeovers—Defensive Measures—Equality of Shareholders, in BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN:
CASES AND COMMENTS 323 (Moritz Bälz et al. eds., 2012) (summarizing the Bull-Dog
Sauce case).
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based on option allotments.72 This case involved a bid by Steel
Partners, a U.S. private equity fund, for all outstanding shares of
Bull-Dog Sauce Co. Ltd,73 the manufacturer of a popular series of
Worcestershire-type sauces. In response to the bid, Bull-Dog Sauce’s
board proposed the defensive measure of allotting three share
options per share to all existing shareholders. All shareholders
except Steel Partners would be eligible to exercise the options,
whereas Steel Partners would be entitled, in the event that the
options were exercised, to receive in lieu of shares a cash payment
of over $2 billion. In other words, Bull-Dog’s defensive measure
would have financially compensated Steel Partners for the
discriminatory issuance of shares to the other shareholders.
Critically, “as the bid was made shortly before Bull-Dog Sauce’s
annual general meeting, the board decided to put its proposed
defensive measure before the shareholders for approval.”74
Astoundingly, the proposed measure was approved by 88.7% of a
qualified majority of shareholders;
in effect, almost every
shareholder (excluding Steel Partners) voted in favor.
Undaunted, Steel Partners applied for an interim injunction
restraining the option allotment—“a strange turn of events
considering that none of the [other] shareholders appeared to be
willing to sell their shares to the hostile acquirer.”75 The Tokyo
District Court declined to grant the Steel Partners’ application for an
injunction in a decision that was upheld on appeal to the Tokyo
High Court and further appeal to the Supreme Court of Japan.
According to the Supreme Court, target shareholders have the right
72
But see Oda, supra note 71, at 329-30 (arguing that the case’s significance will
be limited because of its unique circumstances); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra
note 3, at 37 (asserting that, in accord with the views of “leading Japanese
academics,” the case’s “unusual circumstances” distinguish it from typical hostile
takeover cases).
73 See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul? Courts,
Corporations, and Communities—A Comment on Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 353-56 (2009) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce]
(summarizing the Bull-Dog Sauce case and arguing (id. at 356) that one effect of the
case “may be to encourage the (re-)establishment of corporate ties to stable, longterm shareholders”).
74 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36. See also Oda, supra note 71, at
324 (describing the board’s view that the bid would harm the company and its
decision to resist the bid before the annual shareholders’ meeting).
75 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36. See also Oda, supra note 71, at
324 (describing the bases of the injunction, which are “that the issuing of share
options was against the equality of shareholders” and that it was conducted “in a
grossly unfair manner”).
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to decide whether the risk of damage to the corporation justifies the
adoption of defensive measures. The Supreme Court further held
that, in light of the “fair and adequate measures” taken by the target
to compensate the bidder for depriving the bidder of its right to
exercise its options, “the target’s discriminatory treatment of the
bidder as a shareholder was justifiable.”76
Notwithstanding the buzz generated by the Bull-Dog Sauce case
and the jurisprudence arising therefrom within Japan77 and in the
international press and scholarly literature,78 the weight of its legacy
today is debatable. First, the facts were highly unusual. Given that
nearly all shareholders of the target supported the defensive
measure, one might reasonably question why the defensive measure
was required at all if the existing shareholders were unwilling to
tender their shares to the acquirer in the first place. Whether major
shareholders of future targets of hostile takeovers would similarly
rally in support of incumbent management is open to serious
76 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36-37. See also Oda, supra note 71,
at 326 (citing the Court’s conclusion that the allocation of share options was neither
inadequate nor “against the idea of fairness”).
77
The leading commercial law periodical publisher in Japan dedicated a 442page special issue collecting documents relevant to the case. See BURUDOGGU SŌSU
NO HŌ-TEKI KENTŌ: BAISHŪ BŌEISAKU NI KANSURU SAIBAN KEIKA TO IGI (ブルドックソ
ース事件の法的検討—買収防衛策に関する裁判経過と意義) [LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
THE BULL-DOG SAUCE CASE: THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ON ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSIVE
MEASURES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE] (別冊商事法務編集部 [Editorial Board of
Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu] ed., 別冊商事法務311号 [Vol 311, Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu], Shōji
Hōmu 2007).
78
E.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative
Corporate Governance, in I FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24.
AUGUST 2010 806, 808 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., De Gruyer 2010) (“The fact that
the target shareholders had approved the defensive plan was a particularly
significant factor in [the Bull-Dog Sauce] judgements.”); Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Japan
High Court Keeps Bull-Dog Sauce From Steel Partners’ Jaws, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2007),
[https://perma.cc/DG9U-YNX3] (discussing the effects of the Bull-Dog Sauce
decision on Bull-Dog Sauce, Steel Partners, and the Japanese government); Hideki
Kanda, Takeover Defences and the Role of Law: A Japanese Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES
IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 413, 420-22 (Michel Tison et al. eds.,
2009) (relating the characteristics of the Bull-Dog Sauce case to Japanese statutory
law); Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 73, at 353-56 (summarizing the case and
discussing its potential effects, particularly as they relate to contemporary hostiletakeover developments); Nathan Rayne & Reiji Murai, Japan’s Bull-Dog OK’s Poison
Pill for Steel Partners, REUTERS (June 24, 2007), [https://perma.cc/8FR6-H5TY]
(arguing that the Bull-Dog Sauce case could set a precedent for the “hundreds of
other firms” using poison pill defenses); Alison Tudor, Steel Partners Presses on with
Bull-Dog Bid, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2007), [https://perma.cc/Z7RP-YW8S] (“[S]ome
financial analysts fear the [Bull-Dog Sauce] ruling may erode investor appetite for
the Japanese equity market.”).
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question in light of changes to shareholding structure in Japanese
firms since the mid-2000s (a point that we discuss below in Part 3).
A further curiosity lay in Bull-Dog shareholders’ overwhelming
support79 for a defensive measure that included a generous payment
to the hostile acquirer, which may have been driven by good reasons
at the time.80 However, the Corporate Value Study Group, in a
second report released in June 2008, soon expressed its disapproval
of defensive measures that would involve cash or financial payoffs
to acquirers,81 and modern defensive measures typically no longer
include such a feature.82 We move to modern defensive measures in
the next Section.
79
Although beyond the scope the present Article, such curiosities may
perhaps only make sense in a context where the alchemy of stable-shareholders and
corporate cultural norms creates an impenetrable wall against the barbarians at the
gate. See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 37-41 (arguing that Japanese
culture has formed a barrier to hostile takeovers), 40 (noting that “support for
incumbent management by stable shareholders has consistently defeated takeover
bids over the last several decades”).
80
See Iwakura Masakazu & Sasaki Shigeru, Burudoggu Sōsu ni yoru Tekitai-teki
Baishū ni taisuru Takō Sochi (Ge Sono 2) (ブルドックソースによる敵対的買収に対す
る対抗措置（下その2) [Measures Against Hostile Acquisition by Bull-Dog Sauce (Part
2.2)], 1825 SHŌJI HŌMU 36, 38 (2008) (observing that the issue of “economic equality”
between the acquirer and the other shareholders came up during preliminary
injunction proceedings, but that the Supreme Court did not go so far as to make the
payment of appropriate compensation to the acquirer an absolute condition for a
defensive measure).
81
See CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURES IN LIGHT
OF RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 3-4 (June 30, 2008), [https://perma.cc/XE336HX6] (“Granting cash or other financial benefits to the acquirers in implementing
takeover defense measures invites the actual implementation. As a result, it
deprives shareholders of the opportunities of selling their shares to the acquirers
after adequate time and information necessary for them to appropriately decide
whether to support or oppose the takeovers or the opportunities for negotiation are
ensured. Therefore, it could prevent the formation of an efficient capital market.
Thus, cash or other financial benefits should not be granted to the acquirers.”).
Note, however, that the Takeover Guidelines based on the 2005 report of the
Corporate Value Study Group was not updated.
82
See, e.g., M&A HŌ TAIKEI [COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF M&A LAWS IN JAPAN]
(Mori Hamada Matsumoto ed., 2015) (describing common hostile takeover
measures). As early as 2008, defensive measures that no longer involved direct cash
compensation to the acquirer were put in place; Marusan’s plan, for example,
permitted the acquirer to exercise warrants provided that it divest part of its
holdings via securities firms designated by the issuer. Marusan Shōken ga Shingata
no Baishū Bōeisaku, Tekitai-teki Bashū-sha ni mo Jōken-tsuki de Kenri Kōshi wo Nin’yō (
丸三証券が新型の買収防衛策、敵対的買収者にも条件付きで権利行使を容認)
[Marusan Securities Adopts New-Type Defensive Measures, Exercise of Rights by Hostile
Acquirers Subject to Conditions Approved]’ REUTERS JAPAN (May 16, 2008),
[https://perma.cc/N85Z-EDQQ]. As a recent example, when Kaneka Corporation
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2.2. Ex-Ante Measures: PRPs, or the So-Called “Japanese Poison Pill”
The boom in ex-ante measures—which are adopted by
companies before a specific takeover threat arises—can be traced
back to the Takeover Guidelines jointly issued by two government
ministries after consultation with stakeholders with the goal of
“preventing excessive defensive measures, enhancing the
reasonableness of takeover defense measures and thereby
promoting the establishment of fair rules governing corporate
takeovers in the business community.”83 The Guidelines did not
only make it clear that potential targets may adopt defensive
measures generally;84 by making express reference to pre-bid ex-ante
defensive measures,85 it gave this yet-untested legal tool its blessing.
Released in a pivotal year (2005), in which hostile takeover attempts
reached a new high in the public consciousness, the Takeover
Guidelines not only triggered a subsequent shift in jurisprudence but
also gained a following among practitioners in Japan.
Since the Guidelines were released, the most popular by
consistently overwhelming margins—and the only feasible86—type
revised its PRP, it stated that the revised plan made it clear that the acquirer’s
warrants would not be redeemed for cash. KANEKA CORPORATION, TŌSHA KABUSHIKI
NO DAIKIBO KAITSUKE KŌI NI KANSURU TAIŌ SHISHIN (BAISHŪ BŌEISAKU) (当社株式の
大規模買付行為に関する対応方針（買収防衛策）の継続について)
[ON
THE
CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY ON RESPONDING TO LARGE-SCALE ACQUISITION OF THIS
CORPORATION’S SHARES (ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSIVE MEASURE)]’ (May 12, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/7YNB-LZFX].
83 Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 1 (Introduction).
84
At the time, only ex-post defensive measures had been litigated, most
recently in the Livedoor case. See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 30-33
(describing the events of the Livedoor case, the court’s reasoning, and the thoughts
of various commentators as the events occurred).
85 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 6 (“In the process of adopting
defensive measures in advance of an unsolicited takeover proposal . . .”) (emphasis added).
86
Defensive measures other than of the PRP variety include the “trust-type”
measure. See Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 (“Under a typical trust based scheme, the
firm issues stock warrants to a trust bank with designated shareholders as
beneficiaries of the trust. When a hostile bid occurs, the pill is triggered, and the
trust bank transfers the warrants to the shareholders. The warrants have a
discriminatory feature and the bidder has no right to exercise them, as the terms
and conditions of the warrants usually provide that the warrants are not exercisable
by the shareholders who own 20% or more of the firm’s outstanding stock.”). See
also infra Table 1. Trust-type defensive measures, in contrast to the PRP, were never
adopted by more than a mere handful of companies even in the earliest days. See
Kanda, supra note 78, at 418 (“Among 359 firms . . . 10 have trust-type or similar
warrant schemes.”); Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 73, at 352 tbl. 1 (citing the
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of defensive measures is a category of ex-ante measures known as
jizen keikoku gata bōeisaku [“Pre-Warning Rights Plans”] (“PRPs”).87
Strictly legally speaking, a PRP is nothing more than a statement of
intention of how the board would act in the event of a hostile bid
that takes the form of a press release issued by the target board.88 In
the event of a potential takeover bid that may leave the bidder
holding more than a certain percentage (usually 20%) of the issued
shares, the acquirer is required to disclose information relevant to
their acquisition plans to the target corporation’s board for
consideration and evaluation.89 If the acquirer fails to disclose the
required information, or the proposed acquisition is deemed to be
deleterious to “corporate value” or not in the interests of the
shareholders,90 there would be grounds to trigger the PRP.
Possible variations as to the process by which a PRP is triggered
include: (1) a board resolution only; (2) a board resolution upon the

proportion of trust-type defensive measures in July 2006 and July 2007 as being
6.5% and 2.6%, respectively); infra Table 1 (showing the consistent and
overwhelming dominance of the PRP over alternatives such as the trust-type
defensive measure from 2009). See also Fujimoto et al. (2007), infra note 154, at 34
(pointing to the requirement for a special resolution of the shareholder meeting [i.e.,
a two-thirds vote] and the need to draft a detailed outline for the issuance of share
warrants (発行要項) as reasons that the trust-type measure failed to catch on). See
also Baishū bōeisaku – kiso chishiki: raitsu puran – shintakugin ni yoyakuken – tokubetsu
ketsugi nekku ni (買収防衛策、基礎知識――ライツプラン、信託銀に予約権、特別
決議ネックに。) [Defensive Measures—Basic Knowledge: Rights Plans – Issue of
Options to Trust Banks – Special Resolution as Obstacle], NIKKEI SANGYŌ SHIMBUN 22
(morning edition, June 20, 2006) (citing the requirement of a special resolution and
the 30 to 40 million-yen fee payable to trust banks as reasons for the trust-type
plan’s loss of market share).
87 Cf. Hideki Kanda, Corporate Governance in Japanese Law: Recent Trends and
Issues, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 69, 73 (2015) (using the alternative nomenclature of
“advance warning plan”).
88
See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed
and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 254 (2011)
(observing that “[u]nlike the U.S. shareholder rights plan, the pre-warning rights
plan is not a legal instrument”).
89
Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797.
90
See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797-98; Armour et al., supra
note 88, at 254 (asserting that a company may trigger a PRP if it “determines that
the acquisition would damage the ‘corporate value of the company or the common
interests of the shareholders’ ”); Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 (“[I]f a shareholder
attempts to increase its stake to 20% or more of the firm’s outstanding stock . . . the
shareholder is required to disclose and explain . . . its intent to hold such stock and
what the shareholder would do for the firm.”).
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recommendation of a special committee; or (3) a shareholder vote.91
If triggered, the board would allot share options that are exercisable
by shareholders other than the bidder and its associates.92 Although
the Takeover Guidelines expressly contemplates the adoption of a PRP
by board resolution,93 in practice, a shareholder vote is usually
necessary when adopting or triggering a PRP.94 Most modern PRPs
automatically expire after a period of one to three years.95 They may,
however, be modified or renewed with shareholder approval or be
abolished at any time by a resolution of the board or the shareholder
meeting.96
Compared with ex-post (i.e., post-bid) defensive measures, the
modern PRP’s prospects of withstanding judicial scrutiny—if and
when directly challenged—are open to even greater doubt. The
most relevant case on point is Nireco (2005).97 In that case, an early
version of the PRP failed to survive judicial scrutiny, as the Tokyo
District Court granted an injunction restraining the company from
implementing the measure.98 The decision was sustained upon
appeal to the Tokyo High Court.99 However, in contrast with
91
See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797; Armour et al., supra
note 88, at 254 n.175 (listing three processes for triggering the issuance of warrants:
“by simple board resolution,” “upon board resolution acting at the
recommendation of an independent committee,” or “upon vote of the
shareholders”); Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 & 419 n.16 (reporting that with the
majority of PRPs, the decision to trigger the plan rests with a special, independent
committee).
92
Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 798.
93 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 6 (“[I]t is not appropriate to reject
outright the adoption of defensive measures by the board of directors when such
measures enhance shareholder interests.”). However, the Guidelines were also
careful to stress that shareholders should be permitted to dismantle a boardimplemented defensive measure. Id.
94
See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 5-6 (emphasizing the “principle of
shareholders’ will” in the adoption of defensive measures). Cf. Kanda, supra note
78, at 419 (describing how in practice, most proposals for advance-warning-type
defense measures obtain shareholder approval).
95
The overwhelming majority of PRPs have a three-year validity period. See
MARR, infra note 250, at 33 (showing that 349 of 383 PRPs as of Oct. 31, 2018, 366 of
405 as of Dec. 31, 2017, and 395 of 443 as of Dec. 31, 2016 fall into this category).
96
Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 798.
97
For a discussion of the Nireco case, see Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note
3, at 35.
98
Tokyo District Court [Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho] June 1, 2005, 1186 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 274; Tokyo District Court [Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho] June 9, 2005,
1186 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 265.
99
Tokyo High Court [Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho] June 15, 2005, 1186 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 254.
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modern PRPs, the defensive measure in Nireco would have
discriminated not only against the acquirer but also against another
sub-group of “innocent” shareholders.100 With Nireco offering
limited if any jurisprudential value, and no judgment having ever
resulted from a modern PRP post-Nireco, modern PRPs have yet to
undergo trial by fire. Insofar as they continue to be primarily nonlegal and contingent in nature, we remain none the wiser as to the
actual legal consequences that would flow from a triggered modern
PRP. Also, and perhaps most importantly, it should be stressed that
the involvement of shareholder approval in either adopting,
triggering, or renewing PRPs is noteworthy and—as discussed
below—sets it apart from U.S. poison pills, which can clearly be
implemented by the board, can be triggered automatically, and
require no shareholder approval at any stage at all.
2.3. Not Poison, Just Untested Medicine: Japanese Defensive Measures
in Comparative Perspective
Not many jurisdictions receive sustained attention from scholars
and pundits in the English-language hostile takeovers literature, but
three may claim that honor: Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.. It is
always tempting to minimize or overlook the substantive
differences in the law of anti-takeover defenses between these three,
whether because of the myopia that results from viewing one system
through the lens of another or to paint an overly generalized picture

100
See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 796 n.67; Armour et al.,
supra note 88, at 250 n.150 (describing the competing interests and bids of Fuji
Television, Livedoor, and NBS). The Takeover Guidelines (2005) also give as an
example of an unacceptable scheme “a case where stock acquisition rights, etc. with
the exercise conditioned on the initiation of a takeover are actually allocated to all
shareholders before the start of a takeover, with a specific day prior to the start of
the takeover as the record date for allocation (except where resolved or disclosed
prior to the commencement of a takeover that stock acquisition rights will be
allotted on condition that a takeover is commenced). In such cases, it is likely that
all shareholders acquiring stock after the record date, including those who are not
the acquiring person, will incur unexpected losses. In addition, the value of the
stock owned by shareholders as of the record date may also drop significantly. If
the stock acquisition rights are subject to transfer restrictions, it is also possible that
the shareholders cannot recover the portion of their investments corresponding to
such drop in value. In this way the takeover causes unforeseen losses for
shareholders who are not acquiring persons.” Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at
2 n.10.
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of corporate governance convergence.101 In this part, we put any
such temptation to rest by highlighting key differences between
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., and make the case for understanding
the Japanese legal context on its own terms.
Primary purpose rule. Commentators have picked up on apparent
similarities102 between Japan’s judicially developed primary
purpose rule on the one hand and the “no frustration rule”
contained in the Takeover Code103 and “proper purpose duty”
imposed on directors of target corporations as a matter of statutory
Nonetheless, substantial
and common law104 on the other.
differences exist. First, Japan’s primary purpose rule is limited to
share/share option placements and share option allotments. By
contrast, directors of U.K. companies are bound to exercise all the
powers of their office (whether they concern share options or
anything else that directors have the power to do) in accordance
with the purpose of conferring those powers.105
101
On this theme, albeit in other corporate law contexts, see Dan W. Puchniak,
The Derivative Action in Asia: A Complex Reality, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2012)
(asserting the necessity of considering local factors like case law, economic forces
and corporate governance institutions when attempting to understand how
derivative action functions in Asia’s leading economies); Puchniak & Nakahigashi,
supra note 3, at 42 (concluding that “in order to understand hostile takeovers in any
given jurisdiction, it is best to understand that jurisdiction on its own terms);
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 356-57 (2001) (outlining three forms of corporate governance,
plus two forms of hybrids, but conceding that “[t]he diversity of circumstances
suggests that there can be no general prediction of the mode that convergence of
national corporate governance institutions may take.”).
102
See Armour et al., supra note 88, at 250 n.147 (“Doctrinally, this [primary
purpose rule] is similar to U.K. common law.”).
103
See CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, r. 21.1 (providing that “the
board must not, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting, take
any action which may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated
or in shareholders being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits” or take
specific actions such as the issuance of shares or options).
104
See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 28-29 (“[I]n its application
from the 1980s until 2005, Japan’s ‘primary purpose rule’ could not be any more
different than the United Kingdom’s ‘no frustration rule’ and ‘proper purpose’
duty.”); see also Yamanaka, supra note 56.
105
BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW ¶¶ 9-49 & 9-59 (5th ed., Oxford
University Press 2018); R.C. Nolan, Controlling Fiduciary Power, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
293, 299 (2009) (“the proper purposes doctrine looks to the particular ends intended
to be achieved through certain particular acts and determines whether such ends
are contemplated (and therefore authorized) by the power in question.”)
For the duty as codified, see Companies Act 2006 (c 46), § 171(b) (Duty to act within
powers):
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Second, the scope of Japan’s primary purpose rule does not
overlap precisely with the U.K. proper purpose duty. Although the
Tokyo High Court in Livedoor enjoined the share option issuance on
the facts, the court (and later, the Takeover Guidelines) recognized an
exception to the primary purpose rule by suggesting that share or
share option placements may be conducted even if the primary
purpose was specifically to maintain corporate control. The
situation for the U.K. is different, as the board’s power to issue
shares may be legitimately exercised for purposes other than raising
capital.106 However, even setting aside the City Code’s nonfrustration rule,107 in no event may the power to issue shares108—or
perhaps any other power109—be used to upset the existing balance
of power within the company. It also remains an open question in
the U.K. as to whether a decision taken in pursuit of an improper
A director of a company must—
(a) act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.
Companies Act 2006 (c 46), § 171(b). It is true that the “proper purpose duty” in the
U.K. does take on special prominence in the context of board interference with
shareholder control of the company (i.e., change of corporate control). See ANDREW
GRIFFITHS, CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 106 (2005) (“In practice, the ‘proper
purposes’ doctrine has been invoked to prevent the board of a company from using
its powers of management to interfere with the ‘ownership’ powers of the
shareholders and thus their ultimate control of the company.”); HANNIGAN, supra ¶
9-57 (citing several cases where courts curbed directors’ attempts to manipulate the
company through improper exercise of their power to allot shares). For the leading
case on the English position on the director’s duty to act for proper purposes in the
context in change of control transactions, see Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc
[2015] UKSC 71, [2016] 1 BCLC 1; see also Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd
[1974] AC 821 (P.C.) (appeal taken from New South Wales).
106 See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821, 835-37 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from New South Wales). See also id. at 837 (Lord Wilberforce) (stating
that it is “too narrow an approach to say that the only valid purpose for which
shares may be issued is to raise capital for the Company”); PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH
WORTHINGTON, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 489-90, ¶16-26 (10th
ed., 2016) (citing Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd) (“It was argued that the
only proper purpose for which a share-issue power could be exercised was to raise
new capital when the company needed it. This was rejected as too narrow.”).
107
CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, r. 21.1.
108
DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 106, ¶ 16-27.
109
There is doubt as to whether the directors of a U.K. company even have the
authority to adopt takeover defenses more generally. In Criterion Properties plc v
Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28, [2004] 1 WLR 1846, the House of Lords
remanded for trial the issue of whether the directors of a U.K. company had the
authority to enter into a “poison pill” arrangement by which a change of control in
the company or the company’s managing director’s dismissal would trigger a put
option on substantially advantageous terms for a particular major shareholder.
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purpose—among other concurrent, legitimate purposes—would be
permitted to stand.110
PRPs. The Japanese PRP, as an ex-ante measure, can be, and is
often, adopted by firms even when no specific threat has surfaced.111
In this regard, it bears some superficial resemblance to the U.S.’
“clear-day” poison pill, which refers to “pills that are adopted in a
purely preemptive way (and not in response to any particular threat
like a hostile tender offer, or the disclosure by an investor that the
investor has acquired a significant block of the firm’s shares).”112
Nevertheless, referring to PRPs as “Japanese poison pills” risks
obscuring several critical differences.
First, it bears repeating that the modern Japanese PRP is all but
completely untested in court.
Numerous questions remain
unresolved with any reasonable degree of certainty by a body of
jurisprudence or binding government regulation.113 What terms are
permissible and what are not in the PRP? Which corporate organ or
organs has or have the sole or shared authority to adopt a PRP?
What exact corporate formalities and procedures must be followed
when implementing or triggering a PRP? What are the respective
roles played by the board, independent directors, special
committees, and the shareholder body during the initial adoption or
renewal process? How about when the PRP is to be triggered? In
contrast, a large volume of litigation over U.S. poison pills in the
Delaware courts over the last three decades has led to a
comparatively much clearer, if sometimes shifting, understanding
110
Compare Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC)
(appeal taken from New South Wales) 832 (“substantial or primary purpose”), 835
(“substantial purpose”) (Lord Wilberforce) with Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas
plc [2015] UKSC 71, [2016] 1 BCLC 1 [22] (preferring a “but-for” test by which an act
would be invalidated only if the discretionary power to perform that act would not
have been exercised but for the improper purpose) (Lord Sumption JSC with whom
Lord Hodge JSC agreed), and with [51]-[54] (Lord Mance JSC with whom Lord
Neuberger PSC agreed) (declining to take a firm position in the absence of full
argument).
111 See, e.g., Fujimoto et al. (2008), infra note 154, at 46 fig. 9 (reporting that only
8.2% of respondents cited share-ownership by activist funds as the reason for
adopting a defensive measure).
112
Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills (NYU School
of Law Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No 16-33, Sept 27,
2016), at 3 n.1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836223 [https://perma.cc/QUF98MM8] (defining the “clear-day” poison pill).
113
In this regard, the Takeover Guidelines, although produced under the
sponsorship of two government ministries, cannot be considered binding
regulation—not least because it is expressly meant not to be. See also Takeover
Guidelines, supra note 44, at 3.
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within the business and legal community about the device’s legal
function. Crucially, the jurisprudence is clear that a U.S. board can
unilaterally put a pill in place and thereby gain the power for
practical intents and purposes to “just say no,” regardless of how the
shareholders might vote.114
Second, there is a difference, if not in law, then in the spirit of
anti-takeover defensive measures. Shareholder approval115 plays a
major role in PRP practice. For some years now, an overwhelming
majority of PRPs are adopted with some form of shareholder vote.116
Shareholder involvement is also significant when triggering an
adopted PRP. As of 2018, less than 30% of all PRPs in force can be
unilaterally triggered by the board of directors or a board committee
entirely without shareholder approval.117
The remaining
supermajority—over 70%—involves shareholders in the decisionmaking process in some way. Perhaps surprisingly,118 about 10% of
all PRPs make shareholder approval a necessary condition to

See supra note 23.
A shareholder vote can be either a precatory (advisory) resolution of the
shareholder meeting, or a resolution of the shareholder meeting within the meaning
of the Companies Act. Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797.
116
For example, in 2011, only 17 PRPs were adopted solely by authority of the
board, whereas 500 received shareholder approval or ratification; in 2018, the
respective figures were 7 and 376. Recof M&A MARR, infra note 155, at 33; see also
Fujimoto et al. (2008), infra note 154, at 50 & fig 14 (reporting that out of 570 firms
with defensive measures in place, only 15 (2.6%) adopted a defensive measure with
only a board resolution; another 13 (2.3%) bundled the defensive measure question
together with resolutions to appoint directors; all the rest (95.1%) sought a clear
shareholder mandate), 51 & fig 15 (reporting that out of 136 firms, 107 (78.7%) put
the renewal of an expiring defensive measure to a shareholder vote, another 11
(8.1%) bundled the issue with director election, and only 18 (13.2%) did not seek
any shareholder vote); the leading scholar on defensive measures in Japan argues
that an efficient PRP is one that may be triggered by the board if and only if
authorized ex ante by the shareholder meeting. Tanaka Wataru (田中亘), Tekitai-teki
Baishū ni Taisuru Bōeisaku ni tsuite no Oboegaki (ni kan) (敵対的買収に対する防衛策
についての覚書（二・完） [A Memorandum on Defensive Measures Against Hostile
Takeovers (Part 2 of 2)], 131 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI (民商法雑誌) 800, 828, 833 (2005).
117
As of 31 October 2018, of the 383 PRPs in place, 110 (28.7%) could be
triggered by a decision of the board or a board committee (“torishimariyaku-kai ketteigata” PRPs); the respective figures as of 31 December 2017 were 125 out of 405 PRPs
(29.6%); 31 December 2016, 153 out of 443 PRPs (34.5%): Recof M&A MARR, infra
note 155, at 33.
118
Writing before PRPs took recognizably modern form, Tanaka considered a
shareholder approval requirement at the point of triggering to be unnecessary and
possibly inefficient. Tanaka, supra note 116, at 824, 826.
114
115
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trigger.119 The rest—an absolute majority of all PRPs—adopt a
“compromise” model where shareholder approval would be sought
where this is deemed necessary.120
Given that shareholder participation in both adoption and
execution of a PRP is the norm in Japan today, it seems fair to say
that shareholders continue to be the lynchpin of the PRP system. As
a result of the absence of clear, legally-binding guidance on the
legality and operation of PRPs, PRPs do not axiomatically shift the
balance of power from one organ to another. Rather, they merely
reflect—and at most, mildly reinforce—the pre-existing balance of
power between shareholders and the board. By contrast, U.S. law,
which has always focused on the board’s authority to implement
and trigger poison pills,121 places considerably less emphasis on
shareholder involvement than Japan as a matter of law.
The analysis above in this Part has shown how Japanese
“defensive measures” and the relevant jurisprudence, whether of
the post-bid ex-post or the pre-bid ex-ante variety, bear no more
than a passing resemblance to their purported counterparts in the
U.K. and the U.S.. The primary purpose rule that applies to ex-post
defensive measures differs from the U.K. proper purposes duty in
scope, and Japan does not have anything resembling the clear nofrustration rule of the U.K.’s City Code. In contrast to the welltested, and demonstrably lethal, U.S. poison pill, Japanese PRPs
remain an unknown variable.
Japan’s unique suite of defensive measures is not the only thing
that is different from the more familiar Anglo-American world.
There is a history of successful hostile takeovers in the U.S..122 By
contrast, whether before or after the tumultuous events of the mid2000s, not a single hostile takeover attempt succeeded in Japan—but
why? The answer to this question, dubbed the “Enigma” of hostile
takeovers in Japan,123 cannot be found by looking only at the law
and practice of Japan’s legally-untested defensive measures. To
119
As of 31 October 2018, 39 of 383 PRPs (10.2%) fall into this category
(“kabunushi ishi kakunin-gata”); as of 31 December 2017, it was 39 of 405 (9.63%); 31
December 2016, 43 of 443 (9.71%). Id.
120
As of 31 October 2018, 234 of 383 PRPs (61.1%) are “secchū-gata”; 31
December 2017, 241 of 405 (59.5%); 31 December 2016, 247 of 443 (55.8%). Id.
121
For Delaware jurisprudence, see Part 1 above.
122 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:
How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 855-56 (1999)
(tracking hostile bids and their success rates from 1988 to 1998).
123
Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3.
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solve this puzzle, the next Part investigates the broader corporate
governance and cultural context surrounding Japan’s non-existent
hostile takeover market.
3. MEDICINE DOESN’T CURE YOU WHEN YOU AREN’T SICK:
JAPANESE CULTURAL NORMS, THE NON-EXISTENT HOSTILE
TAKEOVER MARKET, AND THE SO-CALLED “PILL”
It is a truth universally acknowledged in American scholarship
that a jurisdiction in possession of a highly dispersed stock market
must be in want of hostile takeovers124—at least it was, until the
scholars met Japan. It is well known that stock ownership in Japan’s
listed corporations have for a long time been characterized as
amongst the most highly dispersed in the world.125 A further
distinctive feature of listed corporations in Japan was the abundance
of targets seemingly ripe for takeovers, with bust-up values often
exceeding market capitalization.126 Scholars and pundits alike have
long proceeded on the rarely challenged assumption that the United
Kingdom and Delaware—the world’s two most active hostile
takeover markets—served as the model for Japan’s regulatory
environment and capital markets.127 This combination of widely
dispersed stock ownership, low price-to-book values, and
regulation ostensibly based on hostile-takeover-oriented models
seemingly distinguish Japan as one of the most hostile takeoverfriendly jurisdictions in the world.
Reality, however, is quite another story: hostile M&A in
contemporary Japan remains squarely in the realm of theory and
fiction.128 Not a single hostile takeover has ever succeeded in
Japan.129 The persistent failure of would-be hostile acquirers in what
124
Armour et al., supra note 88, at 221-22 (“Internationally, hostile takeovers
are a rare phenomenon, occurring with any frequency in only a handful of
countries. They are rare because they can only take place in companies with
dispersed stock ownership, themselves something of a rarity internationally.”)
125 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 5 (“only shareholders in the
United Kingdom and United States are as dispersed as in Japan”).
126 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 5-6, 13-14.
127 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 22-38.
128 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 14.
129
We define a successful hostile takeover as one where 1) the bid is
unsolicited and actively opposed by incumbent management; 2) the bid satisfies the
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should have been a “hostile takeovers utopia”130—even before the
advent of as-yet legally questionable defensive measures—is
another example of Japanese exceptionalism. To crack this enigma,
two features of Japan’s corporate landscape offer valuable clues.
First, the conventional wisdom that dispersed shareholding
facilitates hostile takeovers breaks down in Japan. Shareholding in
Japanese firms may be dispersed, but not all dispersed shareholders
are created equal. Japanese firms are dominated by a subset of
dispersed shareholders known in the literature as “stable
shareholders.”131 Stable shareholders are sympathetic “insider(s)”
mandatory bid rule trigger (i.e. aimed at acquiring at least two-thirds of the
company’s shares); 3) the bid achieves its objectives; and 4) the bidder replaces
incumbent senior management, including the board. This excludes managementinitiated leveraged buyouts (MBOs) and partial offers in which the bidder intended
only to secure a less than two-thirds’ stake in the company. For a concise
explanation of the Japanese mandatory bid rule, see Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra
note 3, at 24-25.
There is no consensus among observers identifying any single case as a successful
hostile takeover. Cf. Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness: Japanese
Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
195, 200, 232-50 (describing various hostile attempts and the controversy over
whether they may be classified as successful) with Dōi-nai Baishū, Kabunushi Kyōkan
Hirogaru-ka / Tekitai-teki TOB, Sukunai Seikōrei (同意ない買収、株主共感広がるか
敵対的TOB、少ない成立例) [Acquisitions Without Consent—Gaining Shareholder
Sympathy? The Few Successful Examples of Hostile Tender Offer Bids], 毎日新聞
[MAINICHI
SHIMBUN]
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://mainichi.jp/articles/
20190207/k00/00m/020/257000c [https://perma.cc/T5UB-Z6YF] (last visited Feb.
11, 2019) (listing only SSP Co., Ltd. and Solid Group Holdings as the only two
successful takeovers). However, even these two exceptional examples do not fit
our definition. The 2000 bid for SSP Co., Ltd. was not opposed by the board and
the few successful examples of unsolicited acquisitions were not by open bid, but
rather on-market purchases. Fujinawa Ken’ichi (藤縄憲一), Tekitai-teki Baishū to
Taikō-saku wo meguru Giron ni tsuite (敵対的買収と対抗策を巡る議論について) [On
the Debate Surrounding Hostile Acquisitions and Their Countermeasures], RIETI (Feb.
13,
2006),
https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/bbl/06021301.html
[https://perma.cc/G4L7-9237]. The 2007 successful hostile bid for Solid Group
Holdings (now CARCHS Holdings) by Ken Enterprise was not for all outstanding
shares, but only up to 66.58% (under the two-thirds mandatory bid triggering
threshold) and succeeded because Lehmann Brothers tendered its 48% stake. See
Ken Entāpuraizu no Soriddo Gurūpu HD e no Tekitai-teki TOB Seiritsu (ケン・エンタ
ープライズのソリッドグループＨＤへの敵対的ＴＯＢ成立)
[Ken
Enterprise’s
Hostile Tender Offer Bid for Solid Group Holdings Succeeds], REUTERS JAPAN (Dec. 13,
2007),
https://jp.reuters.com/article/idJPJAPAN-29348620071213
[https://perma.cc/TS37-VACQ]. For discussion on the recent Itochu bid for
Descente, see Section 4.3 below.
130 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 8.
131 See Paul Sheard, Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance, in THE
JAPANESE FIRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 310, 314, 318 (Masahiko Aoki &
Ronald Dore eds., 1994).
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that generally refrain from taking action detrimental to the
incumbent management132 because of their existing business
relationships with the company. As the Livedoor and Bull-Dog Sauce
cases133 powerfully illustrate, stable shareholders have on multiple
occasions given hostile acquirers pause by rallying in support of
incumbent management,134 even when doing so came at a direct
financial cost to themselves.135 Although Japan’s cross-shareholding
structure has come partly unwound in recent years and foreign
investment has increased, leading Japanese scholars have observed
that these changes primarily affected large public corporations.136
By contrast, small- and medium-sized listed corporations that are
favored targets for activist shareholders continue to maintain low
132
Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203, 209 n.19 (1998)
(defining a “stable shareholder” as one who “agrees not to sell the shares to third
parties unsympathetic to incumbent management, particularly hostile takeover
bidders or bidders trying to accumulate strategic parcels of shares: agrees, in the
event that disposal of the shares is necessary, to consult the firm or at least give
notice of its intention to sell”); see also Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 17
(“stable-shareholders generally consist of banks, insurance companies, or other
non-financial Japanese companies that are ‘typically engaged in some sort of
business transaction with the issuer corporation.’”).
133
See Discussion at Section 2.1.
134 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 18 (“When faced with a hostile
takeover bid with a significant premium, stable-shareholders have little incentive
to sell their shares given that they are not looking to reap capital gains through their
shareholding.”).
135
This is especially so in the Bull-Dog Sauce case. See Gen Goto, Legally
“Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 143
(2014) (noting that given the irrational behavior of individual shareholders voting
for the management’s defensive measure, “it seems logical to conclude that they
had strong sympathy for the targeted corporation and antipathy to the hostile
bidder”).
136
Id. at 145-46; see Miyajima Hideaki & Nitta Keisuke, Kabushiki shoyū kōzō no
tayōka to sono kiketsu—Kabushiki mochiai no kaishō / “fukkatsu” to kaigai tōshika no
yakuwari (株式所有構造の多様化とその帰結―株式持ち合いの解消・「復活」と海
外投資家の役割) [Diversification of Share-Ownership Structure and its Consequences /
Unwinding and “Revival” of Cross-Shareholdings and the Role of Foreign Investors], in
NIHON NO KIGYŌ TŌCHI (日本の企業統治) [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN] 135
(Miyajima Hideaki ed., 2011) (reporting that foreign institutional investors tended
to prefer 1) large scale firms with 2) a larger proportion of revenue deriving from
overseas sales, 3) high return on assets, and 4) low leverage); see also Hideaki
Miyajima & Fumiaki Hiroki, The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan: Causes,
Effects, and Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 79, 86-88 (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory
Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima eds., 2007) (foreign institutional investors began
investing in Japanese stocks after their prices fell in the wake of the burst of the
asset bubble).
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foreign ownership and relatively high cross-shareholding.137
Beyond stable shareholders, incumbent management also appears
to enjoy support from other investors,138 and even foreign
shareholders may be reluctant to challenge the status quo.139 At least
for now, the long-standing antipathy for hostile takeovers shared by
management and stable shareholders140 provides Japanese firms
with a powerful defense against hostile takeover attempts. Japan’s
unique corporate culture141 means that its dispersed shareholder
landscape does not axiomatically render Japanese corporations in
general more vulnerable to hostile takeovers.
A second feature is lifetime employee-dominated senior
management,142 which historically also included large corporate
boards.143 The especially potent combination of economic and
137
Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 146 (discussing activist hedge funds); see also
Tanaka Wataru (田中亘), Kabushiki hoyū kōzō to kaisha-hō—Bunsan hoyū no jyōjyō
gaisha no jirenma wo koete (株式保有構造と会社法―「分散保有の上場会社のジレン
マ」を超えて) [Shareownership Structure and Corporate Law—Beyond the “Dilemma of
Dispersed Listed Corporations”], 2007 SHŌJI HŌMU 30, 31-32 (2013).
138
Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 142-43; see also John Buchanan, Dominic H.
Chai & Simon Deakin, Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Fund Activism in
Japan, SOCIO-ECON. REV. 15 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy007
[https://perma.cc/GF32-86DV] (“Additionally, most Japanese investors tolerate
great management autonomy up to the point that managers prove themselves
clearly inadequate.”).
139
JOHN BUCHANAN ET AL., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN: THE LIMITS OF
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 213-24 (2012); Maddison Marriage, Foreign Investors Fear
Holding Japan Inc to Account, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/080fd530-a7fe-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83.
140
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal
Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2100 (2001)
(suggesting that in an earlier era when corporate law did not offer the flexibility
necessary for the development of defensive measures, “a social norm denigrating
hostile takeovers as unethical could operate as a low-cost substitute for an extensive
system of formal ground rules for M&A activity and as a complement to the
structural obstacle posed by cross-shareholding practices”).
141 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 41.
142
On the role of lifetime employment in Japanese corporate governance
generally, see Časlav Pejović, Changes in Long-term Employment and Their Impact on
the Japanese Economic Model: Challenges and Dilemmas, 37 J. JAPAN. L. 51, 66-68 (2014).
143
Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A
Comparison of Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510, 517, 520 (1994)
(reporting, based on a survey of 119 large Japanese companies from 1980 to 1988,
that 21.63 out of the 22.49 directors on average are “insider directors” with either
previous or current experience as an executive of the firm); Dan W. Puchniak, Why
Investor Trust (and Not the Law) Matters: Japanese Lifetime Employment’s Role as a NonLegal Mechanism for Credible Investor Trust (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318953&download=yes) [https://perma.cc/SU3U-LBT5]
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emotional incentives for lifetime employees of firms in virtually
every industry to maintain control over their companies regardless
of external pressure has proved to be a formidable barrier to the
development of an active market in hostile takeovers.144 Although
not impervious to pressure, Japan’s lifetime employee system has
remained remarkably resilient despite the changing business
environment.145 While lifetime employment is arguably not the
main obstacle to hostile takeovers in Japan, it remains an influential
factor that has caused Japan’s market for corporate control to evolve
in an entirely different direction from the U.S. or U.K.146
In any event, as noted above (in Section 2.3), defensive measures
do not substantially shift the balance of power between corporate
boards and shareholders. They capture and, at best, lightly reinforce
the balance of power as it stood at the time the PRP was adopted or
last renewed. The term-limited nature of most PRPs prevents their
use as a means of effective entrenchment of any state of affairs for
too long a period. So long as the interests of shareholders (especially
(unpublished LL.D. dissertation chapter, Kyushu University) 15 (“A system of
internal promotion for career employees, which extends to the board of directors,
means that career employees dominate the senior management and boards of large
Japanese companies.”); Miyajima Hideaki (宮島英昭) & Nitta Keisuke (新田敬祐),
Nihon-gata Torishimariyaku-kai no Tagen-teki Shinka: Sono Kettei Yōin to Pafōmansu
Kōka (日本型取締役会の多元的進化：その決定要因とパフォーマンス効果) [Multifaceted Evolution of Japanese-Style Corporate Boards: Determinants and Effects on
Performance], in KIGYŌ TŌCHI NO TAYŌKA TO TENBŌ (企業統治の多様化と展望)
[DIVERSIFICATION AND PROSPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 40 fig. 2-4 (Kanda
Hideki (神田秀樹) & Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan (財務省
財務総合政策研究所) eds., Kin’yū Zaisei Jijō Kenkyūkai 2007) (reporting that the
average number of directors in companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange fell from 18.50 in 1993 to 10.37 in 2004, and for the Second Section
from 11.74 to 8.16 over the same period). However, there has been a slight reversal
of late, with the average number of directors falling to a low of 8.61 and 6.88 in 2014
for the First and Second Sections respectively before rebounding to 9.29 and 7.73
respectively in 2016. See Tokyo Exchange Inc., TSE-Listed Companies White Paper on
Corporate Governance 2017 (Mar. 2017), 75 chart 57, https://www.jpx.co.jp/
english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/b5b4pj000001nj2x.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D6L-82BE].
144 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 38-41. For a slightly tonguein-cheek explanation by a leading Japanese attorney on how dire the fate of a senior
executive of a Japanese firm ousted in a hostile takeover would be as compared to
their American counterpart, see Fujinawa, supra note 129 (discussing differences
between Japanese and American senior executives in terms of expected life
outcomes).
145
For an extensive study canvassing a wide range of quantitative and nonquantitative studies, see Sayuri A. Shimoda, Time to Retire: Is Lifetime Employment in
Japan Still Viable?, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 753 (2016); see also Pejović, supra note 142.
146 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 41.
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stable-shareholders) remain aligned with that of the lifetime
employee-dominated management, shareholders will ultimately do
the right thing by not giving in to the invading barbarian. In such
situations, the legal validity of the company’s PRP will be of little
consequence.
A clear appreciation of the social, cultural, and legal context not
only explains why the expected wave of hostile takeovers never
materialized in the mid-2000s, but also arguably how Japanese firms
were more than equipped to fend off hostile takeover attempts even
in the absence of a “poison pill.” This leaves us with one more
puzzle: if the conditions were such that hostile takeovers were never
going to pose a clear and present danger to Japanese firms, what was
the effect of hundreds of Japanese listed companies implementing a
heavily watered-down and legally questionable device that they did
not really need?
4.

CLEARING OUT THE MEDICINE CABINET: THE SILENT DECLINE
OF JAPAN’S SO-CALLED “PILL”

We have seen in the two preceding Parts how Japan’s so-called
“poison pill” is hardly that, and how the corporate governance
environment in Japan has created natural walls that have never been
successfully breached by barbarians, whether Japanese or American,
at the gate. Notwithstanding this, it is well known that hundreds of
Japanese firms had adopted defensive measures—overwhelmingly
of the PRP variety147—in the years immediately following the
tumultuous mid-2000s. But that was then; what has become of the
Japanese “pill” since?
In this Section, we present domestic data collated from Japanese
language sources that have been heretofore unavailable in the
English language literature. The data reveals two distinct but
sustained trends. First, after an initial boom, new adoptions of
defensive measures fell precipitously between 2008–2010, and since
2009–2010 has consistently hovered in the single digits. Second,
since at least 2014–2015, Japanese companies have been dismantling
their defensive measures at an increasing rate.
Since 2014–2015, one key statistic, which we call “attrition,” has
spiked, meaning that it is increasingly likely that a defensive

147

See infra Table 1.
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measure due to expire148 would not be renewed. The combination
of very few new adoptions and increasing attrition points in one
unequivocal direction: down. In just under five years (from January
1, 2014 to October 31, 2018), the number of Japanese firms with PRPs
in place fell from 507 to 383, which is almost a quarter (24.46%).149
Coinciding with a large number of “pills” that expired between mid2016 and mid-2017, these trends led to the astonishing situation in
which 16 times as many “pills” were abolished as they were adopted
in Japan.150
Thus, virtually unbeknownst to those in the West who had once
been captivated by its rise, the once-vaunted “poison pill” is
unmistakably in decline—and has been for some time. The next
question must surely be: why? We therefore set out in this Section
what to our knowledge is the first analysis of the forces that may be
driving the removal of the “pill” in Japanese companies. We round
off this Section with our view on why the PRP may, despite its
falling trajectory, still remain a major feature of corporate
governance in Japan.
4.1. Trends in Adoption and Abolishment
There is no official data on defensive measures in Japan; the best
publicly available, up-to-date data is collected by private actors.151
The most precise and granular data available, albeit not for the early
years,152 on defensive measures is from a series of studies by legal
consultants at Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited (“SMTB”)153—
one of Japan’s largest trust banks. The studies were based on
148
Most defensive measures have a validity period of one to three years. See
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
149 See infra Table 1.
150
See Mogi & Tanino (2018), infra note 154, at 19 Fig. 1 (48 abolishments
versus 3 adoptions).
151
The Tokyo Stock Exchange also collects and reports some data, but not at
the level of granularity offered by SMTB analysts. See, e.g., Tokyo Exchange Inc.,
supra note 143, at 28-32 (presenting data on defensive measures aggregated by
listing categories, and divided by several metrics such as turnover, foreign
shareholding, and size of the largest shareholder).
152
In particular, data coverage before 2009 is spotty.
153
Specifically, the “Stock Transfer Agency Business Advisory Department”
(or, in Japanese, 証券代行コンサルティング部). See Organization Chart, SUMITOMO
MITSUI TRUST BANK (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.smtb.jp/tools/english/company/
organization.html [https://perma.cc/EQ4M-RMBZ].
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SMTB’s internal analysis of disclosure documents released by
Japanese firms—and are published annually since 2006 (save for
2014) in Japan’s leading business law periodical, a publication that
is widely read by both practitioners and scholars.154 Another source
available to Japanese practitioners is the proprietary database
(“RECOF Database”) of M&A data that is maintained by the
company publishing the leading specialist M&A practitioner
periodical (MARR) in Japan.155 Although it does not capture the
same range of data as the SMTB studies, the RECOF Database is
154
The studies we drew on to compile Table 2 are: Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji,
Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The
Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2185 SHŌJI HŌMU
18 (2018); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵
対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against
Hostile Takeovers], 2152 SHŌJI HŌMU 31 (2017); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki
Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on
Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2120 SHŌJI HŌMU 12 (2016);
Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状
況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2083 SHŌJI
HŌMU 14 (2015); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū
Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures
Against Hostile Takeovers], 2012 SHŌJI HŌMU 49 (2013); Fujimoto Amane, Mogi Miki
& Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入
状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1977
SHŌJI HŌMU 24 (2012); Fujimoto Amane, Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū
Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of
Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1948 SHŌJI HŌMU 13 (2011); Fujimoto
Amane, Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対
的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against
Hostile Takeovers], 1915 SHŌJI HŌMU 38 (2010); Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki
Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on
Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1877 SHŌJI HŌMU 12 (2009).
For earlier studies, see Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū
Jōkyō (jō) (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況〔上〕) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive
Measures Against Hostile Takeovers (Part 1 of 2)], 1843 SHŌJI HŌMU 42 (2008); Fujimoto
Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入
状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1809
SHŌJI HŌMU 31 (2007); Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū
Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures
Against Hostile Takeovers], 1776 SHŌJI HŌMU 46 (2006). We did not include data from
studies published before 2009 due to incompleteness and incomparability of the
data with subsequent studies. No study was published to the best of our
knowledge by the SMTB analysts in 2014, although partial unpublished data was
obtained from Mogi Miki and Tanino Kōji, regular authors of the SMTB studies. It
should also be noted at the outset that minor discrepancies exist between the SMTB
figures (or figures extrapolated therefrom) released in different years, although
these discrepancies have no impact on the broader picture and trends.
155 RECOF
M&A Dētābēsu (レコフM&Aデータベース) [RECOF M&A
Database],
MARR
ONLINE,
https://www.marr.jp/recofdb.html
[https://perma.cc/AS2Q-VDGM] [hereinafter Recof M&A MARR]
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useful for multi-year trends and for information specifically on
reasons for abolishment of defensive measures. We present data
sourced and processed from the two sources in three separate tables
in the Appendix, augmented by references to other sources of data
in the description.156
Notwithstanding considerable uncertainty then as now as to the
legal efficacy of defensive measures, the period from 2005 to 2008
saw a flurry of adoptions of defensive measures by Japanese firms.
As Table 1157 shows, firms with active defensive measures grew by
multiples each year, from just 2 at the end of 2004 to 29 in 2005, 175
in 2006, and 409 in 2007. According to data collected by the Daiwa
Institute of Research,158 the number of firms with defensive
measures peaked at 574 in August 2008.159 Since then, as Figure 1160
and Table 1 show, the trend in the number of firms with active
defensive measures—overwhelmingly PRPs161—has gone only one
way: down.162 Since 2010, PRPs have been falling by several
percentage points each year;163 as of 31 October, 2018, the number of
listed companies with active defensive measures is 387—a figure not
seen since 2007.164
156
This is necessitated by the fact that the two predominant datasets cannot
be effectively combined because of differences in reference dates and periods. By
presenting separately-sourced data in separate tables of overlapping content, we
seek to paint an empirical picture of defensive measures in Japanese firms that are
as clear and accurate as possible.
157
This is compiled based on M&A Kenkyūkai Hōkoku 2009, infra note 250, at
10 Figure 1-13, 30, and Recof M&A MARR; see also infra note 250, at 33.
158
Daiwa Institute of Research (Daiwa Sōken) is the think tank of Daiwa
Securities Group, a leading investment banking and financial services
conglomerate. See Yoriyuki Kusaki, Message, DAIWA INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH GROUP,
https://www.dir.co.jp/english/corporate/message/president.html
[https://perma.cc/XMY9-CJGE] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).].
159
Fujishima, supra note 48, at 2 tbl. 1.
160
The data for Figure 1 is sourced from Table 1.
161
See Table 1 (showing that since Dec. 31, 2009, no more than four or five out
of the several hundred defensive measures in place in any given year were not
PRPs). As such, it is fair to say that for practical intents and purposes, PRPs are—
and have been for some time—synonymous with the modern Japanese “poison
pill”.
162
See Table 1 (showing continuous decline after 31 December 2009 until 31
October 2018); see also Table 2 (from 2008 to 31 July 2017).
163
Except 2009, where the change (net decrease of one PRP) was minuscule.
164
See Table 2 (reporting that as of July 31, 2007 and July 31, 2008, there were
respectively 374 and 570 firms with defensive measures in place); see also Fujishima,
supra note 48, at 2 tbl. 1 (reporting that as of November 2007, 409 firms had
implemented defensive measures).
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Fig. 1 Active PRPs and Other Defensive Measures,
2004–2018
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Table 2165 shows key trends in adoptions and abolishments of
defensive measures.166 For defensive measures in force at a given
point in time, the absolute decline in number (also available in Table
1167) is also reflected in the corresponding decline as a percentage of
all listed companies in Japan.168 As the net change (whether in raw
165
Table 2 is based off SMTB analyst data. Note that the SMTB analysts do
not reveal their exact source or scope of data beyond “tabulated by SumitomoMitsui Trust Bank from disclosure documents of each company.” See, e.g., Mogi &
Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32 fig. 1.
166
The SMTB data does not provide breakdowns for PRPs; all figures
comprise all types of defensive measures.
167
Albeit with a reference date of Dec. 31 each year for Table 1, instead of July
31 (for Table 2).
168
Defensive measures’ prevalence peaked at around 15% of listed companies
in 2008. Igusa Rei (荏草礼依), Baishū Bōeisaku Dō’nyū Jōkyō: Dō’nyū Shasū wa 10-nen
Renzoku Genshō, Pīku-zen no 2007-nen to Dōsuijun no 405-sha ni (買収防衛策導入状況

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

730

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

figures or percentage terms) is a function of both: (1) new adoptions
by companies which did not already have defensive measures; and,
(2) abolishments by companies that already had them, it is helpful
to examine the figures separately.
Figures for new adoptions annually are set out in Table 2 and
graphically presented in Figure 2. Up to 2008, a boom in defensive
measures resulted in hundreds of new adoptions of defensive
measures each year.169 As Figure 2 dramatically shows, the bust
came just as quickly, with the number of defensive measures
adopted each year falling precipitously between 2008–2010, and
reaching and remaining in the single digits since 2009–2010. Having
held steady for almost a decade, this trend is by now old news in
Japan; it would not be misleading to call this the “not-so-new”
normal.170 Despite this, there has been scant acknowledgement of
the sluggish state of new adoptions in the English language
literature.171
Details on abolishments specifically are presented in Table 3.172
Over the course of almost five years (from 1 January 2014 to 31
October 2018), the total, cumulative number of defensive measures
abolished more than doubled, rising from 133 to 286, which is an
increase of 115%. Table 3 also classifies abolishments by cause. A
decade ago, as much as half of defensive measures were

～導入社数は10年連続減少、ピーク前の2007年と同水準の405社に) [Anti-Takeover
Defensive Measures: 10-Year Continuous Decline in Number of Adopting Companies to
405 Firms, Same Level as in 2007 Pre-Peak], MARR ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.marr.jp/print/entry/8306 (drawing on data from the RECOF M&A
database). Note that the figure for the number of companies adopting defensive
measures (569) in the article was as of the end of 2008, which explains the
discrepancy with Daiwa Institute of Research’s data (574 as of August 2008).
Fujishima, supra note 48, at 2. Table 2 shows that the percentage of listed companies
in Japan with defensive measures in place stagnated until around 2014, whereupon
it entered a continuous decline, falling from 13.4% in 2014–2015 to 11.3% by 2016–
2017.
169 See Table 1 and Figure 1 (showing massive growth in the number of active
PRPs from Dec. 31, 2005 through Dec. 31, 2008).
170
It is suggestive that for several years now, the fact that very few firms
introduce defensive measures has not received analysis or even comment in the
SMTB studies.
171
Neither earlier work by one or more of the present authors, nor the latest
high-profile hostile takeover paper featuring Japan did so. See Armour et al., supra
note 88 (picking up on this).
172
See infra Table 3.
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discontinued because of M&A activity.173 Since 2013, however, as
Table 3 shows, despite occasional spikes in M&A-related
abolishments from time to time (in 2012, 2014, and 2016), the most
common cause of abolishment by far is non-renewal upon
expiration.
This may be contrasted with two interesting
observations: (1) a defensive measure was abolished on grounds of
failure to obtain a favorable shareholder vote only once ever, in 2014;
and (2) management only rarely preemptively abolishes a defensive
measure before it is due to expire.174 The dominance of abolishment
by non-renewal suggests that while there is no compelling pressure
on management to proactively abolish a measure while it is still in
force, increasingly the affirmative case for renewing a measure upon
expiration—whatever it might be for the firm in question—is not
made out.
However, classifying an abolishment as “non-renewal” does not
answer the further, and perhaps even more interesting question:
why exactly was the decision taken not to renew? Recent data on
shareholder resolutions pertaining to defensive measures sheds
some light on this. Although it was reported in 2018 that every
resolution renewing or amending a defensive measure put to a vote
in 128 firms within the June 2017 meeting season was successfully
passed, in 32 firms (or 25%) the resolution received less than 70%
shareholder approval, with at least two firms receiving less than
55%.175
This is consistent with the finding in another study that there has
been a general decline in shareholder approval rates for defensive
measure resolutions since 2013.176 The latter study further suggests
that a reason why the decline was not even more pronounced lay in
the fact that firms receiving low shareholder approval in the past
have since turned to outright abolishment.177 It is thus possible that
a substantial percentage of “non-renewal” cases might in fact have
turned out to be “failure to obtain shareholder support” cases if
173
See Fujimoto et al. (2008), supra note 154, at 51 (reporting that 9 of the 18
defensive measures abolished up to July 31 2008 were attributable to management
integration (経営統合), management buyout, acquisition, or other M&A activities
broadly defined).
174 See Table 2 (showing 183 of 204 (89.71%) abolishments from 2010–2011 to
2017–2018 were by non-renewal) and Table 3 (showing a total of 7 abolishments
before expiry for 2013–2018, versus 137 abolishments by non-renewal).
175
Igusa, supra note 168.
176
Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 33-34, 34 fig 3.
177
Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 34.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

732

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:3

management had proceeded to put the issue to a shareholder vote.178
Non-renewal may at times be a convenient face-saving way out for
management who would not want to risk losing a shareholder vote
over a defensive measure.
The fact that non-renewal is the primary way by which a
defensive measure is abolished has further implications for attempts
to analyze the decline of defensive measures in Japan. While there
is data on the number of defensive measures (or PRPs specifically)
abolished each year (Tables 1, 2, and 3), these figures in and of
themselves say little about the level of support for (or opposition
against) defensive measures in each reference period.
Recall that defensive measures in recent years usually have a
validity period of three years,179 and consider that a defensive
measure, once adopted or renewed, is rarely abolished during its
term (Table 3). In 2013–2014, for example, all 23 abolishments were
by non-renewal. Hence, regardless of how much support for (or
opposition against) a defensive measure there is in a given year, for
practical purposes any decision as to whether a defensive measure
has outlived its usefulness is likely to be made only when it is about
to expire, not before. The exact number of defensive measures
abolished in a given reference period would turn not only on the
mood towards defensive measures in that year, but would also
depend on the number of defensive measures that are due to expire
over each 12-month period—which, as Table 2 shows, varies
considerably. Hence, to capture a sense of the overall sentiment
toward defensive measures, we devise the concept of “attrition
rate,”180 by which we mean the percentage of expiring defensive

178
A concrete example of a firm deciding not to proceed with a shareholder
vote on renewal is Fujifilm Holdings, whose proposed resolution on defensive
measures was withdrawn by management just before the shareholder meeting of
2013 on the ground that “it had become difficult to obtain the understanding of a
majority of shareholders.” Fuji firumu, baishū bōeisaku gi’an torisage / sōkai chokuzen
ni (富士フイルム、買収防衛策議案取り下げ 総会直前に) [Fujifilm Withdraws
Defensive Measure Proposal Right Before Shareholder Meeting], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
(electronic
ed.,
June
26,
2013),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/
DGXNZO56656240W3A620C1DT0000/.
179 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
180
Although the SMTB studies from 2009 onwards (excluding 2014) contained
attrition and attrition rate figures in whole or in part, nothing was said about the
significance or value of this measure, nor was the term “attrition rate” coined or
defined as such.
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measures that are not renewed.181 A higher attrition rate in a given
year, regardless of the absolute number of defensive measures being
abolished, would thus indicate either less demand for or greater
pressure against defensive measures.
We are able to obtain or compute attrition rate figures for the
years from 2009 to 2018. As Figure 2182 shows, attrition seems to
have progressed in three phases. First, from August 2009 to July
2014, attrition rates held steady between 8-10%, with a one-off fall to
just 3.61% for the 2012–2013 period. Since 2013–2014, attrition rates
have soared to double-digit figures, more than doubling from 9.62%
in 2013–2014 to 20.66% just three years later (2016–2017) and rising
further to 22.60% (2017–2018). The confluence of a high attrition
rate, a large number of expiring defensive measures, and an
exceptionally low number of new adoptions in 2016–2017 led to one
astonishing statistic: for every firm that introduced defensive
measures, 16183 abolished184 them.

181
This measure is only made possible by SMTB analyst data, which tracks
the number of expiring measures and the number of which that are renewed or not
renewed from 2009 onwards.
182
Data for Figure 2 is from Table 2.
183
Mogi & Tanino (2018), supra note 154, at 19 tbl. 1 (reporting that defensive
measures were abolished in 48 firms but introduced in only three in the 12-month
period ending July 31, 2017). Cf. Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32 tbl. 1
(reporting that defensive measures were abolished in 45 firms). The discrepancy
between the 2017 and 2018 studies is resolved in favor of the latter. The respective
adoption/abolishment ratio was 1:5 for 2015–2016 and 1:2.875 for 2014–2015.
184
Following Mogi & Tanino, we do not distinguish between “abandonment”
(in which the management pro-actively dismantles the defensive measure),
“expiry” (in which a term-limited defensive measure is allowed to expire without
renewal), or where the defensive measure has become “defunct” (where the firm
has undergone M&A or delisted). See, e.g., Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at
31.
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Fig. 2 Adoption, Abolishment, and Attrition of Defensive
Measures, 2009–2018
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Although the exceptional adoption/abolishment ratio of 2016–
2017 is a one-off event, the attrition rate has continued to rise. For
the 2017–2018 period, only 115 defensive measures expired,185
presenting a substantially smaller pool of defensive measures
coming up for a decision as to renewal or abolishment as compared
to 213 for the 12 months ending on July 31, 2017 and 171 for the 12
months ending on July 31, 2016 (Table 2). Even though the raw
attrition figure fell from 44 in 2016–2017 to just 27 in 2017–2018, the
attrition rate has nonetheless increased from 20.66 to 22.60%. Given
the trend of rising attrition rates and the fact that a substantially
larger number of defensive measures are likely to expire in the near
185
Igusa, supra note 168 (reporting that 104 defensive measures would expire
during calendar year 2018).
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future—and hence prompt a management decision to let the
measure lapse or seek a shareholder mandate to renew—attrition
data of the next two to three years will be crucial. The tipping point
at which defensive measures go from an institution in decline to just
another colorful concluded chapter in the history of corporate
governance may very well lay just over the horizon.
In sum, the confluence of two trends—prolonged slump in the
number of new adoptions and an increasing attrition rate—
represent a sea change in the Japanese hostile takeover landscape so
significant that it is surprising that it has thus far escaped entirely
any detailed comparative analysis, or even notice in the Westernlanguage literature. Remedying this lapse is the aim of Section 4.2.
4.2. Explaining the Fall in Defensive Measures
The developments described in the preceding Section—which
seemingly renders Japanese firms ripe once again for hostile
takeovers—cries for an explanation: why is this happening? In this
Section, we offer three explanations: (1) Japanese boards no longer
consider defensive measures to be necessary to counter the threat of
hostile takeovers; (2) the PRP has had a de minimis effect on Japanese
corporate governance; and (3) corporate governance changes such
as the Corporate Governance Code and the new disclosure
requirements in Japan’s revised Stewardship Code have increased
institutional investor resistance against renewal of expiring PRPs.
We examine each of these in turn.
1.

PRPs ceased to be necessary as hostile takeovers ceased to be a
threat (“Necessity Explanation”).

Let us assume that PRPs are theoretically, or are at least
perceived to be, effective countermeasures to hostile takeovers.186
An obvious explanation for falling demand for a medicine would be
decreased incidence of the disease the medicine is meant to treat; in
the PRP’s case, that would be hostile takeovers.

186
For why this perception is, with the benefit of hindsight, difficult to justify
today, see Section 2.3 above (explaining why the PRP is of questionable
effectiveness as a matter of law) and Section 4.2 below.
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The collapse in new demand for defensive measures (i.e. new
adoptions) since 2009187 fits particularly well with the Necessity
Explanation. Much of the initial demand for defensive measures,
fueled by the turbulent events of the mid-2000s, was quickly
exhausted; by 2009, a substantial percentage of Japan’s leading firms
had PRPs and other defensive measures in place.188 In the years that
followed, the wave of hostile takeovers anticipated in the mid-2000s
(and before) never materialized in Japan.189 Reduced pressure on
Japanese firms by investment funds in the wake of the Global
Financial Crisis has been linked to the drastic drop in new adoptions
in 2008–2009.190 In recent years, activist investors such as hedge
funds have also moved away from acquiring large blocks of shares
with a view to eventually gaining corporate control via tender offers.
Rather, hedge funds have increasingly favored smaller
shareholdings and other forms of engagement with investee
firms.191 By turning away from outright acquisition (hostile or
otherwise), this shift in investor behavior also suppressed new
demand for anti-takeover defensive measures in firms that were not
early adopters. Trends in new adoptions of defensive measures,
which fell off a cliff around 2008–2009 to just 21 (from 207 in the
previous reference period),192 and thereafter languished in the single
digits,193 reflect these changes in the perceived necessity of PRPs.
The calculus involved in adopting a defensive measure for the
first time is straightforward: if it is necessary and the cost is
affordable, do it. It is certainly possible that a defensive measure,
which was at the time of initial adoption deemed necessary by
management, would later be re-assessed as unnecessary and
accordingly abolished. Considerations of necessity, however, do not
See Table 2, Figure 2.
Id. (noting that by 2009, demand has levelled off with about 24% of
companies with premium listings (on the First Sections) having implemented
defensive measures).
189
For reasons why this was so, see Part 3.
190 See Fujimoto et al. (2009), supra note 154, at 12 (reporting that only 21
defensive measures were adopted in 2008–2009, a sharp decrease from 207 in 2007–
2008).
191
Ishii Yūsuke, Kawaru Kabunushi Sōkai (変わる株主総会) [The Changing
Shareholder Meeting], in KAWARU KABUNUSHI SŌKAI (変わる株主総会) [THE
CHANGING SHAREHOLDER MEETING] 23 (Mori Hamada & Matsumoto ed. 2018). For
recent work on hedge fund activism in Japan, see Buchanan, Chai & Deakin, supra
note 138.
192
See Table 2; Figure 2.
193 Id.
187
188
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necessarily manifest in the same way when a firm’s management is
deciding if an expiring defensive measure should be renewed,194 or
if an existing defensive measure should be abolished proactively
before it expires.
As lived experience (or just common sense) tells us, just because
something becomes factually unnecessary does not mean that
people would axiomatically cease to do it or actively get rid of it;195
they may simply hold on to the thing and just do nothing with it. In
the face of path dependence and switching costs,196 loss of necessity
is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale abandonment
of defensive measures. Although, as noted above, there has been no
abolishment of defensive measures en masse pre-expiry,197 attrition
rates (i.e. percentage of defensive measures not renewed upon
expiry) have increased sharply from 2015 onwards.198 As the
Necessity Explanation is, by itself, unable to account for rising
attrition, we revisit the attrition trend below (at 4.2.3). In the
meantime, recall that the Necessity Explanation is premised on the
PRP as a necessary, or at least a somewhat useful, device. But does
this premise really hold—and what happens if it does not?
2.

The PRP’s effect on Japanese corporate governance is de minimis
(“Legal Irrelevance Explanation”).

Initial hopes that the PRP would serve as a potent anti-takeover
defense may have justified their initial adoption on grounds of
“necessity” in the early years. With the passage of time, however, it
becomes increasingly difficult to make the same case for the PRP.
194
Most, although not all, defensive measures are valid for a fixed term; see
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
195
A simple analogy will suffice: is there not at least one person you know
(or yourself) who keeps old medicine around, even when the illness it was meant
to treat was cured or never came to pass?
196 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 9-14 (Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (discussing path dependence and barriers to
changes in corporate governance); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69-113 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe
eds., 2004); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence and
Complementarity in Corporate Governance, in Gordon & Roe, id. at 114-27.
197
At Section 4.1; see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
198
Table 2; Figure 2.
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We have established199 that the modern Japanese PRP is nothing like
the mature, potent, and binding legal instrument that is the U.S.
poison pill; it remains a legally untested construct whose legitimacy
appears to hinge on shareholder support. In contrast with the
“shadow pill” effect of the U.S. poison pill that protects every listed
company in the U.S. regardless of whether a pre-bid “clear-day”
poison pill is in place,200 it is far from clear whether the PRP, when
put to the test, will be even worth the paper it is written on. Japan’s
PRP is, at best, “a shadow of a shadow.”
That is not to say that just because the PRP is (or likely to be) of
little utility in a real hostile acquisition, it is also ipso facto a
deleterious feature of corporate governance. As discussed above (at
Section 2.3), the PRP does not substantially shift power from the
shareholder meeting to the board; it reflects the balance of power
existing at the time of adoption or renewal, and (at best) mildly
reinforces it for the duration of the PRP. Based on the best
information available to us now, PRPs would be most accurately
characterized as inconsequential and irrelevant features of Japanese
corporate governance.
The Legal Irrelevance Explanation accounts for the sluggish
demand for new adoptions over the past nine years. There is
generally no compelling reason for a firm to adopt a PRP, given that
the board and supportive shareholders are capable of fending off
hostile takeovers on their own—and especially if the financial or
political cost is substantial. Conversely, there is no urgent need for
management to abolish existing PRPs if holding on to them does
little harm. Rising attrition rates over the past four or so years,
therefore, cannot be attributed entirely to the Legal Irrelevance
Explanation. The final, critical question is: how did the cost side of
the cost-benefit analysis change significantly in recent years? This
brings us to our third and final explanation.
3.

Corporate governance changes sparked increased institutional
shareholder resistance to defensive measures (“Investor
Resistance Explanation”).

Even as successful hostile takeovers have maintained their
absence, Japan’s corporate governance environment has nonetheless
199
200

Section 2.3.
Id.
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undergone substantial changes in recent years. Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code was first implemented in June 2015 and last
amended in June 2018.201 Principle 1.5 provides that:
With respect to the adoption or implementation [i.e.
triggering] of anti-takeover measures, the board and
kansayaku [statutory auditors] should carefully examine their
necessity and rationale in light of their fiduciary
responsibility to shareholders, ensure appropriate
procedures, and provide sufficient explanation to
shareholders. 202
Although investor discontent with defensive measures may be
nothing new,203 coupled with growing criticism of defensive
measures from not only foreign but also domestic institutional
investors,204 the introduction of the Corporate Governance Code
with this interesting feature appears to have prompted a number of
firms to proactively abolish defensive measures.205 In this sense,
201
TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (June 1,
2018),
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/
20180601.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEU2-ARSF].
202 Id. at 8. Principle 1.5 was untouched by the 2018 revision.
203 See, e.g., Fuji firumu, baishū bōeisaku gi’an torisage / sōkai chokuzen ni (
富士フイルム、買収防衛策議案取り下げ 総会直前に)
[Fujifilm
Withdraws
Defensive Measure Proposal Right Before Shareholder Meeting], Nihon Keizai
Shimbun
(electronic
ed.,
June
26,
2013),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNZO56656240W3A620C1DT0000/
[https://perma.cc/AD94-PG87] (reporting that both domestic and foreign
institutional investors increasingly object to defensive measures on the grounds
that they lead to managerial self-preservation); Kawasaki Kisen nado 19 sha,
bōeisaku wo haishi, konnendo, 479 sha wa nao keizoku (川崎汽船など１９社、買
収防衛策を廃止、今年度、４７９社はなお継続。) [19 Firms Including Kawasaki
Kisen Abolish Defensive Measures; 479 Firms Continue to Have Them]; Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 13 (morning ed., June 12, 2015) (noting that strong investor dissatisfaction
with defensive measures has been present since before the Corporate Governance
Code took effect).
204 See ”Kawareru kakugo” de kau—bōeisaku haishi, tōshika wa kangei (「買われる覚
悟」を買う――防衛策廃止、投資家は歓迎) [Buying with the “Readiness to be
Bought”—Investors Welcome Abolishment of Defensive Measures] NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, 18 (morning ed., May 24, 2017) (also reporting that outside [comparable
to independent] directors with management expertise have increased, and there
have been cases in which such directors advise abolishment of defensive measures).
205 See Kawasaki Kisen nado 19 sha, bōeisaku wo haishi, konnendo, 479 sha wa nao
keizoku (川崎汽船など１９社、買収防衛策を廃止、今年度、４７９社はなお継続
。) [19 Firms Including Kawasaki Kisen Abolish Defensive Measures; 479 Firms Continue
to Have Them], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 13 (morning ed., June 12, 2015) (citing the
example of Nisshinbo Holdings as a firm that had taken into consideration the
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changes in the corporate governance environment have made it
easier for institutional investors to express—either through or
beyond voting at shareholder meetings—their own, possibly longheld objections to defensive measures.
A further development is the 2017 revision of Japan’s
Stewardship Code, which introduced a new provision exhorting
institutional investors to disclose their votes by individual investee
company and by individual agenda item.206 The revision quickly
made its impact felt: even before the amended Code formally went
into effect, a number of institutional investors proactively disclosed
their past voting records.207 Japanese commentators have attributed
the especially pronounced spike in PRP abolishments in 2017

Corporate Governance Code’s coming into effect in its decision not to renew its
PRP, but also noting that deep-seated wariness of hostile acquisition by other firms
in the same industry have kept the number of firms taking proactive steps towards
abolition low); see also Sōkai no shōten (10) baishū bōeisaku—hihan tsuyoku genshō keikō
(総会の焦点（１０）買収防衛策――批判強く減少傾向。) [Shareholder Meetings
Focus (10): Anti-Takeover Defensive Measures—Strong Criticism, Trend of Decline],
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 15 (morning ed., June 22, 2015).
206
Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors, Japan’s Stewardship Code,
(May 29, 2017), 15 at Guidance 5-3, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/
stewardship/20170529/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C44Z-WWXY] (“Institutional
investors should at a minimum aggregate the voting records into each major kind
of proposal, and publicly disclose them. Furthermore, to enhance visibility of the
consistency of their voting activities with their stewardship policy, institutional
investors should disclose voting records for each investee company on an
individual agenda item basis.”). For the pre-amendment position, see Principles
for Responsible Institutional Investors, Japan’s Stewardship Code, (Feb. 2014), 11 at
Guidance
5-3,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/
20140407/01.pdf, [https://perma.cc/D2X6-ZRQV] (“Institutional investors should
aggregate the voting records into each major kind of proposal, and publicly disclose
them. Such a disclosure is important in making more visible the consistency of their
voting activities with their stewardship policy.”); Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of
Stewardship Codes: The Case of Japan, University of Tokyo Business Law Working
Paper Series, No 2018-E-01, 45-47 (Oct. 2018), http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/wpcontent/uploads/sites/10/2018/10/BLWPS2018E01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZX8-MSQ5], BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming).
207 See, e.g., Ema Naoyoshi (依馬 直義), Nihon-ban Suchuwādoshippu Kōdo Kaitei
wa Kabunushi Sōkai, Giketsuken Kōshi ni Dō Eikyō Shita ka (日本版スチュワードシッ
プ・コード改訂は株主総会、議決権行使にどう影響したか)
[How
Did
the
Stewardship Code Revision Affect Shareholder Meetings and Exercise of Voting Rights?],
ASAHI JUDICIARY (Aug. 15, 2017), http://judiciary.asahi.com/fukabori/
2017081100001.html [https://perma.cc/UB28-YL2S] (reporting that several
institutional investors have already begun disclosing voting decisions by company
and by individual resolution even before the amended Stewardship Code was
formally promulgated).
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(notable both in terms of attrition rate208 or percentage change209) at
least in part to the Stewardship Code amendment on disclosure
requirements,210 albeit without clear explanation.
Our Investor Resistance Explanation is as follows. Although
institutional investors were previously free, if they so wished, to
support management proposals for defensive measures without
sanction or consequence,211 they are now under pressure to
disclose—and accordingly, justify publicly—their voting decisions.
Given that no general hostile takeover wave ever made its
appearance in Japan for a decade, the management of a particular
firm would be hard-pressed, absent a concrete and firm-specific
hostile takeover threat, to state a compelling reason to maintain a
PRP.212 Without a persuasive, affirmative reason from management,
institutional investors would similarly find it difficult to justify
voting in favor of renewal of expiring defensive measures.
208
See infra Table 2 (defensive measures attrition reached a high of 20.66%,
compared to 16.96% for 2016 and 13.04% for 2015).
209
See infra Table 1 (total number of PRPs in force fell year-on-year by 8.58%
in reference year 2017, compared to 6.34% for 2016 and 3.47% for 2015).
210
Mogi and Tanino (2017) report that of the 43 firms that voluntarily
abolished defensive measures in reference year 2017 (i.e. excluding the two
abolishments following from M&A activity), 10 firms had very high levels of
institutional investor shareholding. They speculate that the difficulty in securing
favorable votes from institutional investors was one of the reasons for abolishment
in these firms. Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32. They further report that
the decrease in favorable votes from domestic institutional investors in shareholder
resolutions to approve defensive measures is attributable to the Stewardship
Code’s new individual disclosure requirement. Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note
154, at 39. See also Mogi & Tanino (2018), supra note 154, at 23 fig. 7 (reporting
substantial declines in the percentage of resolutions on defensive measures for
which domestic individual investors voted in favor, and attributing that fall to the
revised Stewardship Code).
Although the overwhelming majority of abolishments are not as a result of an
attempted renewal failing to garner the necessary shareholder votes in support (see
infra Table 3, showing that the vast majority of abolishments are managementinitiated or based on management-side reasons), as observed above (in the main
text after note 177), it is plausible—even likely—that management would simply
not table a defensive measure for renewal upon expiry if there was reliable
indication that the chances of obtaining shareholder approval were less than
extremely high. The change triggered by the Stewardship Code’s new disclosure
requirement may have thus not only had an effect on the voting percentages on
defensive measures that were put to a vote, but also deterred management in firms
dominated by institutional investors from even seeking renewal of the defensive
measure in the first place.
211
As discussed in Part 3, antipathy for hostile takeovers was, at least until
very recently, widely held by shareholders.
212 See supra Section 4.2.
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The effect of the Stewardship Code revision on investor
resistance against defensive measures is especially interesting as it
hints at an unexpected outcome: a stewardship code—and
stewardship as a concept—can matter. The notion that stewardship
can have concrete impact on individual firms’ corporate governance
practices runs counter to the emerging consensus among corporate
governance scholars that stewardship codes have been largely
ineffectual.213 For the avoidance of doubt, we stress that the Investor
Resistance Explanation is only a tentative one, and that the results
of the voting seasons from 2019 onwards should offer crucial
evidence either confirming or denying the effect of disclosure
requirement changes.
4.3. So, What Are PRPs Good For, Anyway?
If, as we have suggested, the PRP is unnecessary, legally
irrelevant, and increasingly under fire from institutional investors,
then its demise would seem inevitable. Yet time and again, reports
of the demise of many a thing have been greatly exaggerated;214 any
scholar attempting to predict the future of any phenomenon should
be appropriately circumspect.
Even as the Japanese “pill”
seemingly drifts closer towards extinction with each year, prudence
demands that we acknowledge that neither is such progress
inexorable nor the final destination inevitable. Notwithstanding the
PRP’s many failings as a legal mechanism, it may continue to play
at least some role in Japan’s corporate governance landscape for two
reasons.
First, PRPs are considerably more palatable than the
alternatives. One of these is cross-shareholding. A classic215 if
213
Iris H.Y. Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1022
(2014); Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?, 15 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 217 (2015); Brian R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, 73 MOD.
L. REV. 1004, 1024-25 (2010); Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 375 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S.
Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015); see also Goto (2018), supra note 206, at 50-51
(reporting that adoption of the Stewardship Code by private pension funds in Japan
has been underwhelming).
214
Paraphrasing the famous quip widely attributed to Mark Twain.
215 See, e.g., Juro Teranishi, Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan and the Origins
of the Main Bank System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR
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controversial216 feature of Japanese corporate governance, crossshareholding is a system where multiple companies agree to hold
shares in each other’s companies, resulting in a web of mutual or
circular shareholdings.217 By locking down most of the issued shares
of participating listed companies, cross-shareholding insulated
incumbent management from external pressure and posed a
formidable obstacle to hostile takeovers.218 Throughout the lost
decade, cross-shareholdings were gradually unwound in many
Japanese firms, although the extent and degree of this unwinding
differs between firms.219 Unlike cross-shareholdings, which are
difficult and costly to create and unwind, PRPs can be adopted and
removed as and when necessary and with relative ease. PRPs also
offer advantages compared to other existing defensive measures.
Compared to the sole alternative220 ex-ante measure, the trust-type
plan, PRPs are considerably cheaper to implement and maintain.221
Ex-post measures222 also suffer from their own drawbacks.
Share placements to friendly stable shareholders remain a
possibility but would require at the time of crisis either the support
of a supermajority of shareholders, or substantial financial

DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 59-61, 63-64, 78-79 (Masahiko Aoki &
Hugh Patrick eds., Oxford University Press 1994) (tracing the early history of crossshareholding).
216 See RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM—
JAPAN AND GERMANY VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS 92-96 (Oxford University Press
2000) (“The cross-shareholding system has never had an altogether good press in
Japan . . . [r]ecently there has been . . . discussion of cross-holdings in the context of
the corporate governance debate, and it is surely obvious that unless management
stability can be shown to have some relation to shareholder value by improving
performance or raising the share price, it is impossible to explain to shareholders
the rationale for cross-holdings.”).
217
Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 210-21 (2000); Goto (2014),
supra note 135, at 128 n12.
218
Shishido, supra note 217, at 208-11. Shishido, however, also argues that
firms stabilized by cross-shareholding are ultimately subject to capital market
discipline as cross-shareholders would still sell their shares if corporate
performance were to be unacceptable. Id. at 211.
219
Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 144-46.
220
Class shares were adopted as a takeover defense around 2004, but no firm
has adopted it since for this purpose due (at least in part) to resistance from the
stock exchange. KANDA HIDEKI, KAISHA-HŌ (会社法) [CORPORATE LAW] 177 (20th
ed., Yūhihaku 2018).
221 See supra note 86.
222
See Section 2.1.
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commitment from a supportive stable shareholder.223 A Livedoortype placement of share options to a particular (friendly)
shareholder without shareholder approval is vulnerable to
challenge in court;224 a Bull-Dog Sauce-style option allotment
discriminating between the bidder and other shareholders would
not succeed without both substantial shareholder support and
considerable cost to the target company.225 In this regard,
notwithstanding its weaknesses from a purely legal standpoint, the
PRP remains the cheapest defense available to a Japanese listed
company—provided it can command the necessary shareholder
support and would survive judicial scrutiny if challenged (which, as
explained above, is uncertain).226
This brings us to our second point: if hostile takeovers are ever
perceived as a real threat again, we may expect to see a revival in
PRPs. Thus, to stop the PRP’s decline dead in its tracks—or spark a
renaissance—might require no more than a single instance of a
hostile takeover repelled by a triggered PRP, or perhaps even
something much less drastic. Consider the case of Kawasaki Kisen
Kaisha, Ltd. (“Kawasaki Kisen”), a shipping and logistics concern,
which announced in May 2015 that its PRP would not be renewed
(i.e. abolished) upon expiration in June that year.227 Within just two
months, the Singapore-based hedge fund Effissimo Capital
223
A share placement at a “particularly favorable” (特に有利な金額) price to
the placee requires a special resolution (two-thirds) of the shareholders. Companies
Act, §§ 199(2), 199(3), 201(1), 309(2)(v). Conversely, a share placement at a fair price
may be conducted by the board without a shareholder vote (Companies Act, §
201(1)), but would cost the placee.
224 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. For a recent example where
a share placement and option allotment by a listed company was enjoined on the
ground that the primary purpose of the placement and allotment was to change the
composition of the shareholder body, see Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.]
Decision, Jan. 6, 2017, 1516 Kin’yū Shōji Hanrei (金融商事判例) 51.
225 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
226
For those that have abolished their PRPs or who foresee the loss of
shareholder support necessary for maintaining a PRP, “contingency plans” offered
by advisory firms may offer some comfort. See, e.g., IR Japan, Kontinjenshī puran
sakutei shi’en (コンティンジェンシー・プラン策定支援) [Contingency Plan
Formulation Support], IR JAPAN (2019), https://www.irjapan.net/service/
consulting/contingency.html [https://perma.cc/2QV5-5ZCH].
227
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd, Tōsha kabushiki no daikibo kaitsuke kōi ni kansuru
taiō hōshin (baishū bōeisaku) no hi-kōshin (haishi) ni tsuite (当社株式の大規模買付行為
に関する対応方針（買収防衛策）の非更新（廃止）について) [Re the Non-Renewal
(Abolishment) of the Company’s Policy on Large-Scale Acquisitions of Shares (Defensive
Measures)]
(May
21,
2015),
https://www.kline.co.jp/ja/news/ir/ir6173082786920771957/main/0/link/20150521-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6M8UT99].
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Management (“Effissimo”)228 had accumulated a substantial stake in
the firm;229 by March 2016, it had become Kawasaki Kisen’s largest
shareholder by far230—and remains so as of November 2018.231 The
fact that Effissimo built its dominant position in Kawasaki Kisen so
quickly after the latter abolished its PRP appears a little too
convenient to dismiss as mere coincidence.232 In a further, recent
development, Effissimo officially altered its purpose of
shareholding from “pure investment” to “to advise management
according to the investment and the situation, and to make
important proposals, inter alia”233—the harbinger of greater
activism by Effissimo in the not-so-distant future.234
228
One reason Effissimo receives considerable attention in the Japanese and
international media lies in the connection between its founders to activist investor
Murakami Yoshiaki of the notorious (and defunct) “Murakami Fund.” See, e.g.,
Effissimo Capital becomes top shareholder of Japan’s Ricoh, Kawasaki Kisen,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 4, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/effissimojapan/effissimo-capital-becomes-top-shareholder-of-japans-ricoh-kawasaki-kisenidUKL4N11A1XA20150904 [https://perma.cc/XXJ4-6JDW].
229
Effissimo made its first required filing as a major shareholder (greater than
5%) on Sept. 4, 2015. See Effissimo Capital Management Pte Ltd, Tairyō Hoyū
Hōkoku-sho (大量保有報告書) [Report on Major Shareholding] 3 (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/[https://perma.cc/R9ZS-GTJD] (reporting a
6.18% shareholding).
230
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Yūkashōken Hōkoku-sho (有価証券報告書)
[Annual Securities Report] 36 (June 24, 2016), http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/
[https://perma.cc/UK7H-498X].
231
As of Nov. 12, 2018, Effissimo held 38.99% of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Yonhanki Hōkokusho (四半期報告書) [Quarterly Report]
10 (Nov. 12, 2018), http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ [https://perma.cc/462Y8EH5].
232 See, e.g., Ōshima Shin’ichi, Kawasaki Kisen kabu no tairyō shutoku, baishū
bōeisaku wo haishi shite inakereba chigau kekka ni? (川崎汽船株の大量取得、買収防衛
策を廃止していなければ違う結果に？) [Large-Scale Acquisition of Kawasaki Kisen
Shares: Would the Result Have Been Different Had Its Defensive Measure Not Been
Abolished?], Listed Company Board Member’s Governance Forum (June 28, 2016)
(rev’d May 16, 2018), https://govforum.jp/member/news/news-news/newsmanagement/management-management/19667/[https://perma.cc/8SQ9-TGZ4]
(suggesting that there is a “high possibility” that the impetus for such a rapid
accumulation of Kawasaki Kisen shares lay in the abolishment of its PRP in 2015).
233
Effissimo Capital Management Pte Ltd, Henkō Hōkoku-sho No. 86 (変更報告
書 No. 86) [Report of Amendment, No. 86] 2 (Nov. 6, 2018),
http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ [https://perma.cc/Y4K6-CR98].
234 Effissimo ga Kawasaki Kisen kabu no hoyū mokuteki wo henkō (エフィッシモが
川崎汽船株の保有目的を変更) [Effissimo Amends Its Purpose for Holding Kawasaki
Kisen Shares], IB Consulting (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ib-consulting.jp/
newspaper/310/ [https://perma.cc/JYM2-XGBX] (noting that although Effissimo
had voted against the resolution appointing the president of Kawasaki Kisen at the
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How Effissimo will exercise its newfound power—the
accumulation of which may well be attributable to the abolishment
of defensive measures—may be crucial. Should Effissimo touch a
nerve, it should not surprise if Japanese companies forced to choose
between a politically costly and legally unreliable PRP or letting
activist shareholders stream through open gates, were to conclude
that the former is the lesser of two evils. It is thus only a slight
exaggeration to say that the fate of one of the most fascinating
aspects of Japanese corporate governance may very well rest in the
hands of a few persons based out of a mall on Singapore’s main
shopping street.235
Another recent and closely-watched development is the case of
sōgō shōsha (general trading company) Itochu Corporation’s
activities against the sportswear giant Descente Ltd., which had no
PRP or other defensive measure in place. A longtime major
shareholder of Descente,236 on January 31, 2019, Itochu commenced
an unsolicited tender offer with the target of raising its shareholding
by 9.56%, from 30.44 to 40%.237 The offer price of JPY2, 800 yen a
share amounted to a 50% premium over the average price in January
2019.238 Interestingly, Itochu in its press release expressly declared
June 2016 shareholder meeting, Effissimo has yet to table any shareholder proposals
of its own, and suggesting that Effissimo may put forward its own proposal(s) for
the next [i.e. 2019] shareholder meeting).
235
As of 2019, Effissimo appears to be based out of The Heeren, a shopping
mall on Orchard Road in downtown Singapore.
236 See Itochū no Baishū Teian ni Taikō: Desanto ga Wakōru to Teikei (伊藤忠の買
収提案に対抗 デサントがワコールと提携) [Resisting Itochu’s Suggestion of an
Acquisition, Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal] NIKKEI BUS. (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/report/15/110879/082900855/[https://perma.
cc/T3GF-RY3Q] [hereinafter Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal] (summarizing the
history between Descente and Itochu, including changes in Itochu’s shareholding).
237
Itochu Corporation, Kabushiki-gaisha Desanto Kabushiki (Shōken Kōdo: 8114)
ni Taisuru Kōkai Kaitsuke no Kaishi ni Kansuru Oshirase (株式会社デサント株式（証
券コード：8114）に対する公開買付けの開始に関するお知らせ) [Notice on the
Commencement of Open Offer for Shares of Descente Ltd Shares (Securities Code: 8114)],
15 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.itochu.co.jp/ja/ir/news/2019/__icsFiles/
afieldfile/2019/01/31/ITC190131_j.pdf [https://perma.cc/C84K-K9WB]. Note
that Itochu—in collaboration with Descente’s second-largest shareholder—
controlled over a third of the shares, and thus already had the power to block
fundamental changes, which under Japanese law requires a special resolution
passed by a two-thirds majority. See also Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal, supra
note 236, at 10 (reporting that Itochu had disclosed on Aug. 27, 2018 that it had
raised its stake to 27.70%, and that there were rumors that Itochu and ANTA (which
held just under 7% of Descente) were considering the possibility of a joint
acquisition of Descente).
238
Itochu Corporation, supra note 237, at 13.
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that it had no plans to acquire an outright majority and convert
Descente into a subsidiary,239 despite media reports that the bid was
prompted by a number of factors including: Itochu’s dissatisfaction
with what it perceived to be an excessive reliance by Descente on its
South Korean business, Itochu’s interest in expanding operations in
the People’s Republic of China, as well as Descente’s attempt to go
private via leveraged management buyout.240
Despite resistance from Descente’s president and most of the
board,241 as well as the labor union and Descente alumni,242 Itochu’s
hostile offer closed successfully on March 15, 2019.243 Negotiations
between Itochu and Descente over restructuring of Descente’s board
in February 2019 ultimately broke down. On March 25, 2019,
Descente announced that President Ishimoto Masatoshi (a thirdgeneration member of Descente’s founding family) will step down
as of the shareholder meeting scheduled for June 2019, and will be
239 Id. at 2-3. Among Itochu’s reasons was that maintaining the independence
of the target would facilitate its employees to display their "“excellent planning and
development abilities” to the maximum possible extent. Id. at 2.
240
Ōtsuka Takafumi & Nishimura Gōta, Desanto wo Meguru Baishūgeki,
“Saishū Kecchaku” no Butai-ura: Kaichō Saisokkin wo Okurikomi, Zensekinin wo Ou
Itochū (デサントを巡る買収劇､｢最終決着｣の舞台裏 会⻑最側近を送り込み､全責
任を負う伊藤忠) [Behind the Scenes of the “Final Settlement”: Itochu Takes Full
Responsibility by Sending in Chairman’s Top Aide], TŌYŌ KEIZAI ONLINE (Mar. 28,
2019), https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/273502 [https://perma.cc/E8RD-J59K]
[hereinafter Ōtsuka & Nishimura]; Shuichiro Sese, Itochu-Descente feud escalates into
full-blown
takeover
war,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
REV.
(Feb.
8,
2019),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-deals/Itochu-Descente-feudescalates-into-full-blown-takeover-war [https://perma.cc/FGR9-WEXF]; Desanto e
no TOB, “MBO Teian Kikkake” Itochū Senmu (デサントへのTOB、「MBO提案きっ
かけ」 伊藤忠専務) [Itochu Senior Managing Director: Tender Offer for Descente
“Sparked by Management Buyout Suggestion”], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO40716790R30C19A1TJ1000/
[https://perma.cc/E9TL-ULP8].
241
Descente Ltd, BS Inbesutomento Kabushiki Kaisha ni yoru Tōsha Kabuken ni
Taisuru Kōkai Kaitsuke ni kansuru Iken Hyōmei (Hantai) no Oshirase (BSインベストメ
ント株式会社による当社株券に対する公開買付けに関する意見表明（反対）のお
知らせ) [Notice on Announcement of Adverse Opinion on the Open Offer for this
Corporation’s Shares by BS Investment Corporation] (Feb. 7, 2019),
http://www.descente.co.jp/jp/ir/190207_JP.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUY6-H7R9]
(recommending against Itochu’s offer and noting that Shimizu Motonari, who is an
Itochu nominee director, excused himself from the board meeting, and that
Nakamura Ichirō, who was formerly of Itochu, “reserved his opinion”).
242
Ōtsuka & Nishimura, supra note 240.
243 Itochu Wins Bigger Stake in Sportswear-Maker Descente in Rare Hostile Takeover
for Japan, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/03/15/business/corporate-business/itochu-wins-bigger-stakesportswear-maker-descente-rare-hostile-takeover-japan/ [https://perma.cc/7JLJT9LA].
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replaced by Koseki Shūichi, head of Itochu’s textiles business and
known top aide of Itochu chairman Okafuji Masahiro.244 Descente’s
10-member board of directors will also be downsized to six, with
two from Descente, two Itochu nominees, and two outside directors
who are reputed business leaders with some connection to Itochu.245
In successfully replacing most of Descente’s board, strengthening its
representation on the board, and installing its own senior executive
as Descente’s next president, Itochu’s victorious hostile action246
opens another chapter in the annals of Japanese corporate
governance.
However, it must be stressed that even if there is a one-off
successful takeover247—or further successful hostile action short of a
full hostile takeover similar to the Itochu-Descente saga248—that
sparks fear into the hearts of Japanese management, the “pill” will
Ōtsuka & Nishimura, supra note 240.
Id. The incoming CFO, Tsuchihashi Akira, is an executive officer (shikkōyakuin) and the general manager of Itochu’s internal audit division. Neither of the
two remaining directors from Descente were lifetime employees who joined
straight after graduation; one first joined Descente’s Korean operation, and the
other is a former vice president of Adidas Japan.
246
Note that as Itochu (at 30.44% shareholding) already wielded a level of
effective control even prior to the tender offer and did not seek to acquire an
outright majority in Descente, Itochu’s actions do not fit our definition of hostile
takeover. For the definition, see supra note 129. However, with the support of the
second-largest shareholder, it is possible that Itochu now—with just 40%—may in
practice control a majority of the voting power. See Matsuzaki Yūsuke, “Hatsu” no
Tekitai-teki TOB: Hikari to Kage (「初」の敵対的ＴＯＢ 光と影) [The “First” Hostile
Tender Offer: Light and Darkness], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (morning ed.) (Mar. 19,
2019), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO42592240Y9A310C1DTA000/
[https://perma.cc/6AN7-ZKCN].
247
For the definition, see supra note 129.
248
Another hostile action in Japan’s fast-moving scene to watch is the hostile
bid for Kosaido Co., Ltd. by a fund led by the daughter of Murakami Yoshiaki
launched on Mar. 22, 2019. This bid is in response to a leveraged management
buyout attempt by Kosaido’s founding family and management working in
conjunction with Bain Capital. See MBO Mezasu Kōsaidō e Kyū-Murakami Fando-kei
“Reno” ga Taikō (MBO目指す廣済堂へ旧村上ファンド系「レノ」が対抗TOB) [ExMurakami Fund-linked Reno Counters Kosaido’s MBO Attempt], M&A ONLINE (Mar.
22,
2019),
https://maonline.jp/articles/counter_tob_kosaido2019
[https://perma.cc/Y3ZV-QH2K]; Japan Toys with Shareholder Capitalism Just as the
West Balks, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.economist.com/
business/2019/03/30/japan-toys-with-shareholder-capitalism-just-as-the-westbalks [https://perma.cc/W2QL-JUJF]. As of Apr. 9, 2019, the management buyout
attempt has failed; the hostile bid remains pending. Kōsaidō MBO Shūryō, Nokoru
wa “Taikō TOB” no Yukue (廣済堂TOB終了、残るは「対抗TOB」の行方) [Kosaido’s
MBO Attempt Over, What’s Left Is the “Counter TOB”], M&A ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://maonline.jp/articles/kosaido_tob_mbo201904 [https://perma.cc/4EYZ7X88].
244
245
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never take on American form unless Japanese courts introduce the
active ingredient into PRPs: the ability for the board to adopt a
PRP—without shareholder approval—that provides the board with
a clear veto right over a hostile bid. If this were to occur, perhaps
PRPs would be redesigned in the shadow of this jurisprudence—but
that may take some time and right now seems a long way off. Yet,
only time will tell and we are loath to predict the future.
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS INSPIRED BY JAPAN’S UNIQUE
MEDICINE
By stopping the hostile takeover wave in its tracks, poison pills
won the takeover wars for management, and changed the trajectory
of corporate governance in the U.S. by shifting power from
shareholders to management by empowering boards. The advent of
hostile takeover attempts and indigenous versions of “poison pills”
in Japan, long heralded as a prime candidate for a burgeoning
hostile takeovers market, understandably raised expectations that
Japan’s experience would track that of the U.S. But this was not to
be.
As a medicine lacking the active ingredient in the U.S.-pill (i.e.,
providing the board with a veto right over a hostile bid) the Japanese
“poison pill” is something entirely different than what exists in
America. We hope this Article has made this clear. Perhaps more
importantly, we hope that it provides an accurate understanding of
Japanese defensive measures—especially the rise and fall of the
PRP—on its own terms. At a minimum, this Article should prevent
those who read it from making the comparative corporate law error
of simply classifying Japan with the U.S. as countries that have
adopted the “poison pill.”
Beyond this, there are at least three broader issues that we feel
this exploration has raised that deserve more attention in future
research. First, this Article demonstrates the serious terminological
problem in comparative law, which we feel may be getting worse in
this era of burgeoning globalization where the lingua franca is
increasingly English. A common lexicon of English language
corporate governance terms, which are mostly derived from the U.S.
and U.K. experience, is increasingly used interchangeably by
experts in jurisdictions around the world. Although we see this as
a positive phenomenon in that it promotes inter-jurisdictional
discourse, this Article provides a cautionary tale about how in some
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instances (and we have identified other instances elsewhere)249 it
may terribly mislead.
Second, this Article demonstrates how unique interpretations
(or the lack thereof) of legal concepts by courts can transform the
transplant of a legal idea from one jurisdiction, to something entirely
different in another jurisdiction when it is implemented. For a
variety of reasons, the Delaware Court of Chancery is a unique
animal—both within the U.S. and, especially, when compared to
other courts outside the U.S. The importance and uniqueness of
Delaware’s judicial system in the development of U.S. corporate
governance often seems to be forgotten when U.S. corporate law and
governance concepts are exported abroad. It is relatively easy to
export a general idea—but incredibly difficult to transplant a system
like the Delaware courts which has taken generations to develop
and is constantly evolving.
Third, it is often forgotten how much the timing of introducing
a corporate governance mechanism may impact its development. In
this case, just when Japan’s poison pill was gaining some
momentum, the Global Financial Crisis hit. If not for this, who
knows whether some hostile takeovers would have succeeded in
Japan and the courts may have been forced to handle more cases and
develop a jurisprudence similar to that of Delaware? This is one
more reason why functional convergence of corporate governance
seems to be an academic pipe dream; whereas formal convergence—
at least at the high level of abstraction of simply transplanting
common labels—is already here. However, convergence of labels
that misdescribe their contents not only provides scant intellectual
leverage, but as we have seen in this case, can be terribly misleading.

249
Puchniak, supra note 101 (characterizing claims about how the derivative
action would function based on legal origin or about the superiority of the common
law as misleading); Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent
Directors in Asia: A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL,
CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017)
(treating independent directors in Asia as equivalent in function to those in the U.S.
is misleading, as is considering the rise of independent directors in Asia as evidence
of convergence towards the Anglo-American model of corporate governance).
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APPENDIX
[Table 1] PRPs and other Defensive Measures in Japan, 2004–2018
Source: RECOF Database250

Active
defense
measures,
no. of firms

Year
Total
PRPs
(% total)
Trust-type

Others
Change in PRPs, YoY
(% change)

Year
Active
defense
measures,
no. of
firms

Total
PRPs
(% total)
Trust-type

Others
Change in PRPs, YoY
(% change)

Year
Active
defense
measures,
no. of
firms

Total
PRPs
(% total)
Trust-type

Others
Change in PRPs, YoY
(% change)

2004
2
0
(0)
0
2
N.A.
N.A.

2005
29
20
(68.97)
5
4
20
N.A.

2006
175
163
(93.14)
9
3
143
(815)

2007
409
398
(97.31)
9
2
235
(244.17)

2008
571
562
(98.42)
7
2
164
(141.21)

2009
565
561
(99.29)
2
2
-1
(-.00178)

2010
540
536
(99.26)
2
2
-25
(-4.46)

2011
521
517
(99.23)
2
2
-19
(-3.54)

2012
514
510
(99.22)
2
2
-7
(-1.35)

2013
511
507
(99.22)
2
2
-3
(-0.588)

2014
495
490
(98.99)
2
3
-17
(-3.35)

2015
478
473
(98.95)
2
3
-17
(-3.47)

2016
448
443
(98.88)
2
3
-30
(-6.34)

2017
409
405
(99.02)
2
2
-38
(-8.58)

2018
387
383
(98.97)
2
2
-22
(-5.43)

Figures for 2004–2008 and 2010–2017 are as of 31 December each
year; for 2018, 31 October. Figures for 2009 are extrapolated.

250
Data for 2004–2008 is from the MARR RECOF Database as reported in
M&A Kenkyūkai Hōkoku 2009 (M&A研究会報告2009) [Reports of the M&A Study
Group, 2009] (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government
of Japan) 10 fig. 1-13 (Feb. 2009), [https://perma.cc/8E5J-9S5V] (prepared by Niwa
Shōichi, executive officer of RECOF Corporation). Data for 2010–2018 is from
MARR RECOF Database, M&A Tōkei (Hyō to Gurafu) (M&A統計（表とグラフ）)
[M&A Statistics: Tables and Graphs] 32 (Dec. 2018).
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[Table 2] Trends in Defensive Measures in Corporate Japan, 2008–2018251
Source: compiled from Sumitomo Trust Bank reports in Shōji Hōmu,
2006–2018 (excluding 2014).252
Year
Cos. w/ active measures
As % of all listed
New measures adopted,
previous 12 months
Measures introduced
(cumulative)
Measures abolished,
previous 12 months
Measures abolished
(cumulative)
Measures expiring,
previous 12 months
Attrition, previous 12
months253
Attrition rate, previous
12 months (%)

2008
570
N.A.

2009
567
N.A.

2010
542
14.7

2011
521
14.5

2012
514
14.5

2013
512
14.5

207

21

4

6

6

9

588*

609

613

619

625

634

10

24

29

27

13

11

16*

42

71

98

111

122

N.A.

167

227

285

145

194

N.A.

15

21

24

12

7

N.A.

8.98

9.25

8.42

8.28

3.61

251
Single asterisks indicate extrapolated figures; double asterisks indicate
figures corrected based on studies published in later years; single crosses indicate
figures from or computed based on unpublished data. Each 12-month period for
each reference year runs from Aug. 1 of the previous year to July 31.
252
For full citations to the studies, see supra note 154. No study was published
by SMTB analysts in 2014, but unpublished data on the number of expiring
measures and the number subject to attrition for reference year 2014 was sourced
from Mogi Miki and Tanino Kōji of SMTB and the attrition rate figure for 2014
calculated accordingly. Although every effort at compiling a consistent dataset has
been made, any remaining inconsistencies are an artifact of the original data and
reproduced accordingly; they do not, however, have a material impact on the data.
Where figures from studies published in different years conflict, the later (or latest)
study prevails.
253
Defined as number of defensive measures discontinued out of those due to
expire within a reference year.
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Year
Cos. w/ active measures
As % of all listed
New measures adopted,
previous 12 months
Measures introduced
(cumulative)
Measures abolished,
previous 12 months
Measures abolished
(cumulative)
Measures expiring,
previous 12 months
Attrition, previous 12
months254
Attrition rate, previous
12 months (%)
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2014
494
N.A.

2015
479
13.4

2016
453
12.5

2017
408
11.2**

2018
386
10.4

5

8

6

3

5

639*

647

653

656

661

23

23

32

48

27

145*

168

200

248

275

239†

138

171

213

115

23†

18

29

44

26

9.62†

13.04

16.96

20.66

22.60

254
Defined as number of defensive measures discontinued out of those due to
expire within a reference year.
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[Table 3] Abolished Defensive Measures: Trends and Reasons, 2006–
2018255
Source: RECOF Database.256
Year
Cumulative abolishments
Abolishments each calendar year
Abolishment Non-renewal
initiated by Before expiry
management Other reasons
Failure to obtain
shareholder
Nonsupport
management
Delisting/merger
side reasons
Injunction/winding
up

2011
105*
25
74*
4*
3*

2012 2013 2014
122* 133* 157*
17
11
24
5
7
17
5
0
0
0
1
0

0*

0

0

1

19*

7

3

6

5*

0

0

0

Year
2015 2016 2017
Cumulative abolishments
180* 216* 259*
Abolishments each calendar year
23
36
43
Non-renewal
19
29
41
Abolishment
initiated by
Before expiry
3
1
1
management Other reasons
0
1
0
Failure to obtain
shareholder
0
0
0
Nonsupport
management
Delisting/merger
1
5
1
side reasons
Injunction/winding
0
0
0
up

2018
286*
27
24
2
0
0
1
0

255
Asterisks indicate cumulative figures up to that year. Figures for 2011–
2017 are as of Dec. 31 of each year; for 2018, as of Oct. 31.
256
MARR, supra note 250, at 33.
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